taiV  0f  %t\xi  |ork 


l^^o.  58. 


IN"  ASSEMBLY, 

February  27,  1863. 


MEMORIAL 

OF  THE  CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE  OF  NEW  YORK.  RELATIVE 
TO  THE  DEFENCES  OF  THE  HARBOR  OF  SAID  CITY. 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  State  of  New  York,  ) 
New  York,  February  23,  1863.  I 

Hon.  T.  C.  Callicot, 

Speaker  of  the  Assembly  of  the  State  of  JVew  York: 

Sir — In  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  this  Chamber,  I 
have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you  the  memorial  of  the  Chamber, 
on  the  insufficiency  of  the  present  defences  of  the  harbor  of  this 
city,  and^o  request  that  you  will  lay  it  before  the  Assembly  of 
the  State  for  their  notice  and  consideration. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  respectfully, 
Your  obedient  serv't, 

JOHN  AUSTIN  STEVENS,  Jr., 

Secretary. 

CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE  OF  THE  STATE  OF  NEW  YORK. 

To  the  Hon,  the  Legislature  of  the  State  of  JVew  York,  in  Senate 
and  Jissembly  convened: 

The  memorial  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  State  of 
New  York,  respectfully  represents  : 

That  the  defences  of  the  harbor  of  New  York  are  notoriously 
inadequate  to  the  protection  of  the  vast  interests  and  wealth  of 
a  city  which  is  at  once  the  terminus  of  the  great  avenues  of 

[Assem,  No,  58,]  1 


2  [Assembly 

western  '  and  northern  trade,  the  storehouse  of  national  and 
foreign  products,  the  financial  centre  of  American  commerce,  and 
the  metropolis  of  a  continent. 

Of  the  wisdom  and  necessity  of  making  this  great  gateway  of 
the  State  and  nation  absolutely  impregnable,  there  can  be  no 
doubt. 

Until  quite  recently,  but  little  effort  had  been  made  to  place 
the  existing  fortifications  in  a  state  of  efficiency,  but  your  memo- 
rialists believe  that  under  the  supervision  of  that  distinguished 
and  energetic  officer,  native  of  this  State,  Major  General  Wool, 
all  is  being  done  that  is  at  present  practicable  in  this  direction. 

It  is  of  great  importance  that  there  should  be  no  delay  in  the 
completion  of  the  fortifications  at  Sandy  Hook,  which  command 
the  anchorage  of  the  outer  bay  and  the  main  channel  of  approach 
to  the  city,  and  your  memorialists  suggest  that  the  State  govern- 
ment may,  with  great  propriety  and  in  accordance  with  precedent, 
make  appropriations  for  that  purpose,  and  look  for  repayment  at 
a  future  day  from  the  General  government. 

Other  minor  fortifications  might  be  added,  which  would  keep 
any  vessels  which  succeeded  in  passing  the  main  works  under 
continuous  fire.  The  report  of  Major  J.  G.  Barnard  (now  Briga- 
dier General,  commanding  the  defences  of  Washington),  made  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  in  1859,  on  the  '*  Dangers  and  Defences  of 
New  York,'^  and  printed  at  the  order  of  this  Chamber,  a  copy  of 
which  is  annexed  to  this  memorial,  points  out  the  dangers  and 
the  remedy. 

In  addition  to  these  fixed  works,  your  memorialists  are  of 
opinion  further,  that  some  floating  defences,  either  iron-clad  gun 
boats,  rams,  or  batteries,  armed  with  guns  of  the  heaviest  calibre, 
should  at  once  be  built.  The  present  condition  of  the  East  river 
approach  renders  such  kind  of  defence  imperatively  necessary. 

The  exigencies  of  the  naval  service,  in  a  war  of  such  unex- 
ampled magnitude,  render  a  dependence  upon  it,  for  home  pro- 
tection, uncertain  and  vague.  It  is  called  upon  to  defend  or 
obstruct  a  coast  line  of  thousands  of  miles  in  extent.  At  times 
our  harbor  swarms  with  gun  boats  and  ships  of  war,  at  others, 
hardly  a  solitary  vessel  is  left  for  our  defence. 

This  Chamber  has  made  such  representations  on  this  subject 
to  the  Navy  Department  as  will,  it  is  hoped,  secure  more  certain 
protection,  but  it  is  not  safe  to  rely  on  the  heavily  taxed  resources 
of  the  General  government. 


No.  58.] 


If,  in  time  of  peace,  we  have  neglected  the  wise  warning  to 
prepare  for  war,  at  least,  now  in  war  let  us  not  omit  to  provide 
against  the  contingency  of  foreign  interference.  This  State  and 
this  city  should  be  prepared  for  all  the  eventualities  and  acci- 
dents of  war,  whether  of  sudden  and  temporary  attack,  or  of 
matured  and  declared  invasion. 

To  be  thus  prepared,  the  State  and  city  of  New  York  should, 
in  the  opinion  of  this  Chamber,  at  once  construct  and  own  float- 
ing defences,  in  the  possession  of  which  there  would  be  certainty 
and  security. 

Your  memorialists  believe  that  it  is  only  necessary  to  present 
this  view  of  the  subject,  as  the  result  of  their  deliberate  and 
matured  opinion,  to  secure  early  and  effective  action  on  the  part 
of  the  Legislature  and  the  approval  of  the  Chief  Executive  of 
this  great  State. 

New  York,  February  21,  1863. 

A.  A.  LOW,  2d  Vice  President. 
JOHN  AUSTIN  STEVENS,  Jr., 

Secretary. 


THE  DANGERS  AND  DEFENCES  OF  NEW  YORK. 

Addressed  to  the  Hon.  J.  B.  Floyd,  Secretary  of  War,  by  Maj» 
J.  G.  Barnard,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

PART  L 

In  a  paper  prepared  nearly  a  year  ago,  but  which  from  circum- 
stances  unnecessary  here  to  explain,  has  not  yet  gone  out  of  my 
possession,  I  used  the  following  language,  which  will  now  answer 
my  purpose  as  a  brief  sketch  of  what  I  consider  to  be  the  **  dan- 
gers "  to  which  New  York  is  exposed,  and  as  an  introduction  to 
what  I  shall  say  as  to  the  defences  required. 

**  *  *  *  It  seems  to  me  proper  to  allude  to  the  entire 
change  in  the  nature  of  the  problem  to  be  considered  in  the  de- 
fence of  this  city,  since  the  system  under  which  the  existing 
works  have  been  constructed,  was  adopted — or  rather,  since  the 
defence  of  New  York,  as  a  part  of  the  general  system  of  coast 
defence,  was  decided  upon  by  the  Board  of  Engineers  of  1816.'^ 
As  late  as  1840,  I  find  the  Chief  Engineer,  in  describing  the 
then  existing  works  at  the  Narrows,  (viz  :  the  present  Fort  Ham- 
ilton, Fort  Lafayette,  on  the  Long  Island  side,  and  the  old  Forts 
Tompkins  and  Richmond,  and  Batteries  Hudson  and  Morton,  on 


^  ?  4  [Assembly 

^  Staten  Island,  reporting  that  (when  these  old  works  shall  have 
been  repaired)  'with  the  Narrows  thus  defended,  and  the  works 
near  the  city  in  perfect  order.  New  York  might  be  regarded  as 
pretty  well  protected  against  an  attack  by  water  through  this 
passage.'  And  more  explicitly  he  elswhere  states,  with  regard 
to  repairs  of  the  old  works  just  named,  on  Staten  Island,  'nothing 
further,  indeed,  being  contemplated  for  this  position,  except  the 
construction  of  a  small  redoubt  on  a  commanding  hill  a  little  to 
the  southwest.'  When  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  since  the  quite 
recent  date  of  the  report  from  which  these  quotations  are  taken 
(1840),  there  has  been  constructed  a  new  Fort  Richmond,  of  three 
or  four  times  the  size  of  the  old  work — that  a  large  new  work  in 
place  of  Fort  Tompkins  has  been  commenced — that  a  new  water- 
battery,  nearly  equal  to  Fort  Richmond,  has  been-recommended 
and  planned  by  the  present  Board  of  Engineers — in  fact,  that  an 
enormous  increase  of  works  has  been  decided  to  be  necessary, 
over  those  thus  cited  by  the  Chief  Engineer  as  sufficient  to  render 
New  York  '  pretty  well  protected  by  water  through  this  passage,' 
it  seems  to  me  evident  that  the  problem  involved  in  this  '  protec- 
tion '  has  changed  its  character." 

"  These  remarks  are  not  made  as  a  criticism  upon  former 
Boards,  or  the  Chief  Engineer,  but  to  show  that  a  defensive  sys- 
tem for  New  York  such  as  is  7iow  demanded,  has  never  been  con- 
templated as  a  whole,  and  that  the  problem,  as  it  now  presents 
itself,  is  a  modified  and  enlarged  one." 

"  It  has  become  so,  owing  to  the  immense  developments  which 
have  been  exhibited  in  the  means  of  maritime  attack  within  the 
last  few  years,  and  also  to  the  rapid  growth  of  the  city  itself, 
and  of  the  nation  of  which  it  has  become  the  commercial  metro- 
polis. Indeed,  the  experience  which  the  nation  had  had  when 
the  defensive  system  of  1816  was  adopted,  was  not  such  as  could 
prompt  a  system  adapted  to  our  present  circumstances.  While 
formidable  invasions  of  our  territory  had  been  made  by  land,  the 
small  works  then  in  existence  on  Governor's  and  Bedlow's  islands, 
had  proved  sufficient  to  protect  the  city ;  and  such  efforts  as 
were  made  elsewhere  against  our  maritime  places,  proved  how 
weak  were  the  powers  of  attack  of  that  day  against  fortifications 
— how  little  was  required  to  secure  our  seaports  and  maritime 
cities.  While  the  means  of  maritime  attack  have  of  late  years 
assumed  a  magnitude  and  formidableness  not  dreamed  of  when 
our  defensive  system  was  planned,  and  our  country  has  so 


No.  58] 


5 


increased  in  population,  wealth  and  military  resources,  that  no 
enemy  can  hope  to  make  any  impression  by  an  invasion  of  our 
territory — our  great  maritime  places  like  New  York,  have,  on  the 
f  other  hand,  increased  in  even  greater  proportion,  in  everything 
that  could  make  them  objects  of  attack." 

"  The  works  deemed  adequate  in  former  years  for  the  defence 
of  New  York,  could  not,  therefore,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be 
adequate  at  the  present  day." 

"  The  recent  war  of  England  and  France  against  Russia,  may 
illustrate  my  meaning;  for  it  has  taught  us  what  to  expect  were 
either  of.  these  nations  to  wage  war  against  the  United  States." 

"No  invasion  of  territory,  no  attempt  at  territorial  conquest 
was  made,  or  thought  of ;  for  it  was  well  foreseen  that  no  decisive 
results  would-  flow  from  such  means.  The  war  consisted  exclu- 
sively in  attacks  upon  maritime  places — great  seaports — seats  of 
commercial  and  naval  power.  Such  places  by  their  vast  import- 
ance to  the  well-being  and  prosperity  of  a  nation — -by  the  large 
populations  and  immense  amount  of  wealth  concentrated  in  them, 
and  by  their  exposure  to  maritime  attack,  offer  themselves  at  once 
as  points  at  which  the  most  decisive  results  may  be  produced. 
Crondstadt,  Sebastopol,  Sweaborg,  Kinburn,  Odessa,  Kertch, 
Petropauloski,  and  other  places  of  less  note,  were  in  succession  or 
simultaneously  objects  of  attack  ,  while  such  as  the  first  named 
became,  indeed,  the  true  seats  of  war." 

Around  Sebastopol  assailed  and  assailant  gathered  their  re- 
sources, on  the  result  of  the  arduous  struggle  may  be  said  to 
have  turned  the  issue  of  the  war.  Had  it  not  been  so  decided 
there,  Cronstadt  would  have  been  the  next  field  of  combat — for 
which,  indeed,  the  Allies  had  made  the  most  enormous  prepara- 
tions." 

"  Is  it  not  certain  that  in  future  all  war  of  maritime  powers 
against  the  United  States,  will  take  a  similar  course  ?  All  ter- 
ritoral  invasion  being  out  of  the  question,  it  is  against  our  great 
seaports  and  strategic  points  of  coast  defence — such  as  New 
York,  New  Orleans,  and  San  FranciscO' — pre-eminently  New 
York — that  an  enemy  will  concentrate  his  efforts.  Against  these 
he  will  prepare  such  immense  armaments — against  these  he  will 
call  into  existence  special  agencies  of  attack — which  (unless  met 
by  an  inexpugnable  defensive  system)  shall  insure  success." 

The  mere  defence  of  the  city  against  ordinary  fleets  is  no 
longer  the  question ;  but  through  the  defensive  works  to  he  here 


6  [Assembly 

erected,  the  nation  is  to  measure  its  strength  against  the  most  lavish 
use  of  the  resources  of  a  great  maritime  power,  aided  by  all  that 
modern  science  and  mechanical  ingenuity  in  creating  or  inventing 
means  of  attack,  can  bring  against  them;  in  short,  in  fortifying 
New  York,  we  are  really  preparing  the  battle-field  on  which  the  is- 
sue of  future  momentous  contests  is  to  be  decided.^' 

I  most  respectfully  invite  your  attention  to  the  last  paragraph 
here  quoted.  No  language  that  I  could  now  use,  would  convey 
a  stronger  idea  of  my  profound  sense  of  the  real  dangers  of  New 
York.  If  the  conclusion  that  I  arrive  at  is  well  founded,  it  de- 
mands the  instantaneous  attention  of  the  War  Department,  and 
of  Congress.  If  this  conclusion  is  well  founded,  then  there  is  no 
topic  connected  with  the  question  of  national  defence  which  will 
have  a  stronger  bearing  upon  these  constantly  recurring  issues 
with  foreign  nations,  in  which  we  see  the  war-cloud  gathering, 
which  may  yet,  ere  long,  burst  upon  us,  than  this  same  topic  of 
the  **  defence  of  New  York."  I  will  say  more  specifically,  that 
on  the  alternative  whether,  on  the  one  hand.  New  York  is 
open  to  the  attack  of  a  maritime  force,  or  liable  to  be  sacked  by 
the  sudden  dash  of  an  army  landed  in  the  vicinity  ;  or,  on  the 
other,  is  so  securely  defended  by  water  and  land,  that  it  may  hurl 
the  invader  back  to  the  ocean — will  depend  greatly  the  issue  of 
peace  or  war. 

It  is  a  species  of  folly  approaching  to  insanity,  for  a  nation  so 
constantly  holding  up  to  its  neighbors  the  momentous  issue  of 
war — so  unavoidably  liable  to  constant  entanglements  with  the 
most  powerful  nations  on  the  face  of  the  earth,  to  leave  this 
great  commercial  metropolis  liable,  the  very  day  almost  that  war 
is  declared,  to  the  most  fearful  blow. 

It  is  estimated  that  the  great  fire  of  1835  destroyed  $17,000,000 
of  property.  Yet  its  ravages  were  confined  to  a  very  limited 
erea.  How,  in  money  or  in  words,  could  we  estimate  the  loss  of 
property,  the  destruction  of  military  and  naval  armaments  and 
stores,  the  paralysis  of  the  nation's  commerce,  the  shock  upon 
our  warlike  power,  the  disgrace  upon  our  scutcheon,  which  would 
or  might  result  from  a  successful  attack,  and  a  more  or  less  pro- 
longed occupation  of  the  port  or  harbor  ? 

I  trust,  sir,  I  have  succeeded  in  impressing  you  with  a  vivid 
idea  of  the  "  dangers  "  to  which  New  York  is  exposed,  and  of  the 
importance  of  its  perfect  defence.  If  so,  then  I  am  sure  you  will 
concur  with  me  in  the  opinion  that,  not  as  a  local  question  con- 


No.  58.] 


7 


cerning  New  York  merely,  nor  the  State  of  New  York,  nor  any 
sectional  group  of  States,  but  as  a  great  national  question,  one  in 
which  the  issues  of  peace  and  war,  of  national  triumph  or  na- 
tional disgrace  are  involved,  the  prompt  organization  of  a  com- 
plete and  adequate  system  of  defences  for  New  York,  is  de- 
manded. 

To  say  what  this-defensive  system  should  be,  will,  perhaps,  be 
more  difficult.  I  have  said  before,  that  the  subject  as  a  whole^ 
had  not  yet  been  discussed  in  the  new  lights  in  which  recent  years 
have  presented  it.  I  could,  therefore,  on  many  points  give  only 
individual  opinions,  and,  of  course,  these  must  be  very  general  in 
their  nature. 

But  even  in  attempting  to  give  such  opinions,  I  am  met  by 
the  embarrasssing  fact  that  the  shadow  of  doubt  has  been  recently 
thrown  over  even  the  elementary  principles  which  have  generally 
governed  our  defensive  works,  by  high  authority ;  even  yourself, 
sir,  seem  to  have  found  reason  to  entertain  such  doubts. 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  desire  to.withhold  from  the  freest  discus- 
sion  anything  connected  with  this  great  question.  I  have  assum- 
ed the  problem  of  the  defence  of  New  York  to  be  a  modified  and 
enlarged  one.  I  am  willing  if  you  choose,  sir,  that  it  should  be 
discussed  even  in  its  simplest  elements  ;  and,  still  further,  as  every 
species  of  battery,  armed  with  such  artillery  as  we  now  have, 
whether  it^be  the  simple  earthen  parapet,  or  the  massive  castel- 
lated structure,  lifting  its  numerous  guns,  tier  upon  tier,  are  con- 
fessedly inadequate  (without  auxiliary  aid  of  some  kind)  to  the 
perfect  sealing  up  of  a  channel  against  the  rapid  passage  of  a  hos- 
tile fleet,  I  shall  be  the  first  to  hail  the  inventor,  be  he  one  whose 
"functions  are  confined  to  the  most  elevated  branch  of  military 
science,"  or  to  the  workshop  of  the  mechanic,  who  will  provide 
us  with  something  which  will  do  this. 

In  attempting  to  discuss  the  merits  of  our  coast  defences,  one 
is  met  at  the  very  outset  by  the  opposing  characters  of  the  cri- 
ticisms by  which  they  have  been  assailed.  It  is  now  scarce  twenty 
years  since  the  entire  system  was  subjected  to  severe  animadver- 
sion from  the,  then,  highest  military  authority  of  the  government, 
from  one  whose  public  services,  military  and  civil,  and  high  posi- 
tion and  character,  gave  great  weight  to  his  strictures.* 

It  was  maintained  by  the  authority  to  whom  I  refer  ; 

"  1.  That,  for  the  defence  of  the  coast,  the  chief  reliance  should 
be  on  the  navy." 

*  See  Senate  Pocument  No.  293^  page  1,  24th  Congress,  1st  session,  vol.  4. 


8 


[Assembly 


"  2.  That,  in  preference  to  fortifications,  floating  batteries 
should  be  introduced  wherever  they  can  be  used." 

"3.  That  we  are  not  in  danger  from  large  expeditions,  and, 
consequently," 

"4.  That  the  system  of  the  Board  of  Engineers  comprises 
works  which  are  unnecessarily  large  for  the  purposes  they  have 
to  fulfill." 

It  was  owing  to  these  strictures  that  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, by  resolutions  of  May  9th,  1840,  called  upon  the  War 
Department  "  to  lay  before  this  House  as  soon  as  practicable,  a 
report  of  a  full  and  connected  system  of  national  defence,"  &c. 

The  subject  was  referred  by  the  War  Department  to  a  board 
of  officers  of  the  army  and  navy,  among  whom  was  the  present 
Chief  Engineer.  The  report  of  that  board  (see  Doc.  206,  H.  R. 
26th  Congress,  1st  session),  fully  endorsed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Mr.  Poinsett,  is  universally  admitted  to  be  one  of  the  most 
able  and  comprehensive  expositions  of  the  whole  subject  of  coast 
defence  extant,  and,  generally^  as  a  complete  refutation  of  the 
strictures  upon  our  actual  system. 

This  discussion  has  become  now  somewhat  out  of  date.  I  al- 
lude to  it,  however,  to  call  your  attention  to  the  two  last  strictures 
there  made  against  our  system,  viz : 

"  That  we  are  not  in  danger  from  large  expeditions,  and,  con- 
sequently," 

"  That  the  system  of  the  Board  of  Engineers  comprises  works 
which  are  unnecessarily  large  for  the  purposes  they  have  to  ful- 
fill ;"  and  to  ask  you  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  engineers  are  now 
censured  (whether  deservedly  or  not  is  not  the  question)  for  having 
been  for  the  last  twenty  years  carrying  on  its  constructions  under 
this  very  assumption,  that  we  are  not  ''in  danger  Irom  large  ex- 
peditions." 

I  do  not  discuss,  at  present,  the  accuracy  of  this  proposition 
twenty  years  ago,  or  whether  if  true  then^  it  has  ceased  to  be  so 
now. 

The  report  which  I  have  mentioned  may  be  said  to  have 
silenced  opposition  for  the  next  ten  years ;  but  it  will  (as  I  have 
said  before)  be  considered  out  of  date,  at  present,  owing  to  the 
rapid  developments  since  made  in  means  of  maritime  attacks.  I 
therefore  pass  to  more  recent  animadversions  upon  the  system. 

In  1851  the  following  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the  House 
of  Representatives : 


No.  58.]  9 

*'lst.  Resohed,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  be  directed  to 
report  to  this  House,  the  second  Monday  in  December  next,  on 
the  subject  of  the  land  defences  of  the  country,  in  which  he  will 
review  the  general  system  adopted  after  the  w^ar  with  Great 
Britain,  and  since  pursued,  in  regard  to  the  permanent  fortifica- 
tions then  deemed  necessary  for  the  national  defence  ;  and  that 
he  report,  whether  the  general  plan  may  not  be  now  essentially 
modified,  by  reducing  the  number  of  works  proposed  to  be 
erected,  and  by  abandoning  some  of  the  forts  now  in  progress  of 
construction." 

*'  2d.  Resolved,  That  the  Secretary  of  War  also  report  the 
number  of  fortifications  which  have  been  built,  including  those 
nearly  completed  under  the  general  system,  the  number  in  pro- 
gress of  construction,  and  the  number  not  yet  commenced,  but 
proposed  to  be  erected,  and  in  such  form  as  will  conveniently 
show  the  States  and  Territories  in  which  the  several  forts  are 
situated,  or  to  be  located ;  when  the  work  was  commenced ; 
when  completed,  or  expected  to  be  finished  ;  the  number  and 
calibre  of  the  guns  mounted  or  to  be  mounted  ;  the  estimated 
cost,  the  amount  expended,  and  the  sums  yet  required  to  finish 
or  construct,  as  the  case  may  be,  each  work  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  to  carry  them  into  effect,  addressed  the  following 
queries  to  several  distinguished  officers  of  the  army  and  navy  :* 

"1st.  To^what  extent,  if  any,  ought  the  present  system  of  for- 
tifications for  the  protection  of  our  sea-board  to  be  modified  in 
consequence  of  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels  of  war,  the 
invention  or  improvement  of  projectiles,  or  other  changes  that 
have  taken  place  since  it  was  adopted  in  the  year  1816  ?" 

"  2d.  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  vessels  of  war,  or  of 
commerce,  floating  batteries,  gun-boats,  and  other  temporary 
substitutes  for  permanent  fortifications  ?" 

"  3d.  Is  it  necessary  or  expedient  to  continue  the  system  of 
fortifications  on  the  nothern  lakes?" 

The  character  of  the  strictures  with  which  the  defensive  sys- 
tem was  then  assailed,  may  be  judged  from  the  resolutions  of 
Congress,  and  from  the  queries  proposed.  Essentially  they  were 
the  same  which  we  are  constantly  hearing  now,  the  same  which 

*  These  oflScers  were  Commodore  Stewart,  Commodore  Morris,  Commodore  Perry,  Com- 
mader  Cunningham,  Commader  Dnpont,  Lieutenant  Lanman,  Lieutenant  Maury,  Lieu- 
tenant Dahlgren,  of  the  Navy  ;  General  Totten,  Colonel  Thayer,  Colonel  De  Russy,  Major 
Chase,  Major  Delafield,  of  the  Army. 

[Assem.  No.  58.j  g 


10 


[Assembly 


forever  will  be  heard  to  the  end  of  time,  upon  all  established 
systems,  viz  :  that  it  was  behind  the  times,  that  railroads,  tele- 
graphs, increase  of  population,  war-steamers,  and  steam  ocean- 
navigation  generally,  and  Big- Guns, in  particular,  had  render- 
ed the  system  of  defence  quite  obsolete. 

As  to  the  replies  of  these  several  army  and  navy  officers,  it 
may  be  briefly  stated  that  the  defensive  system  was  sustained  by 
Commodores  Stewart  and  Morris,  Commanders  Cunningham  and 
Dupont,  Lieutenants  Lanman  and  (with  qualifications)  Dalhgren, 
of  the  navy,  and  by  General  Totten,  Colonel  De  Russy,  and 
Major  Delafield  of  the  Engineers.*  That  it  was  opposed  or  cen- 
sured as  requiring  modifications  by  Commodore  Perry  and  Lieu- 
tenant Maury  of  the  navy,  and  Major  Chase  of  the  Engineers. 
Now,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  all  the  recent  "  changes 
which  are  now  supposed  to  have  rendered  our  maritime  defensive 
works  obsolete,  or  "  old  fogyish,"  viz.  :  increase  of  population, 
great  concentration  of  wealth,  population,  and  national  resources 
in  our  great  cities,  railroads,  telegraphs,  ocean  steam-navigation, 
and  the  consequent  facility  of  bringing  upon  our  coasts  suddenly 
large  armies  in  steam  fleets,  improvements  in  calibre,  and  carac- 
ter  of  seacoast  and  naval  ordnance,  horizontal  shell-firing,  &c., 
were  then  well  known,  and,  indeed,  formed  the  foundation  of  the 
strictures  of  that  day.  What  has  happened  since,  has  been  but 
the  realization  of  what  was  then  foreseen. 

If  there  is  any  exception  to  the  broad  statement  just  made,  it 
is  found  in  the  recent  improvement  in  small  arms;  but  this  is  a 
matter  which  I  conceive  to  have  very  little  bearing  on  the  topic 
in  hand. 

A  few  quotations,  .therefore,  from  the  replies  of  tho?  officers 
who  opposed  or  demanded  modifications  in  the  system,  will  be 
interesting  for  colnparison  with  the  views  of  objectors  of  the 
present  day. 

Commotdore  Peray  says,  "  and  besides,  we  have  the  experience 
of  history  to  show  that  extensive  military  works  are  alike  des- 
tructive of  the  prosperity  and  the  liberties  of  the  people,  saying 
nothing  of  the  enormous  cost  of  construction,  and  the  keeping 
them  in  condition  for  service.  I  may  instance  the  fortresses  of 
Spain,  of  Portugal,  and  of  the  former  republics  of  Genoa  and 
Yenice,  as  gigantic  works,  now  of  little  use,  and  looked  upon  by 
the  voyager  only  as  monuments  of  the  extravagance  and  peculat- 

*  Colonel  Ttayer  did  not  respond  ;  his  opinions,  however,  >vcre  weU  known. 


No.  58.J  11 

ing  spirit  which,  at  the  time  of  their  erection,  characterized  the 
people  of  those  governments." 

Experience,  moreover,  shows  that  while  the  fortifications  of 
San  Juan  de  Ulloa  at  Yera  Cruz,  the  Moro  of  Havana,  the  Castle 
protecting  the  harbor  of  Carthagena  upon  the  coast  of  Columbia, 
the  Venetian  fortress  of  Xapoli  de  Romania  in  Greece,  the  Castle 
of  St.  Elino  in  Malta,  and  many  others  of  similar  extent  and 
character,  are  considered  by  some  impregnable,  they  command 
only  a  circuit  embraced  within  the  range  of  their  guns,  and  can- 
not in  any  manner  prevent  a  landing  of  the  en*emy  upon  the 
coast  beyond  the  extent  of  such  range  :  in  a  word,  these  works 
are  useful  only  to  command  the  entrances  of  the  ports  which  they 
were  intended  to  defend,  ^^nd  to  cover,  with  their  guns,  vessels 
anchoring  in  their  immediate  vicinity.  The  celebrated  fortress 
of  Gibraltar  neither  commands  the  passage  of  the  Straits,  nor  the 
anchorage  on  the  Spanish  side  of  the  bay  of  that  name.  They 
are,  in  truth,  like  chained  monsters,  harmless  beyond  the  reach 
of  their  manacles  ;  not  so  with  steam  batteries  :  they  have  the 
means  of  locomotion,  and  their  power  can  be  made  effective  at 
any  point  upon  the  coast  capable  of  being  reached  by  an  enemy's 
vessel." 

"  Of  all  the  coasts  of  Europe,  that  of  Great  Britain  is  the 
least  provided  with  fortifications;  and  yet  her  soil  has  not  been 
trodden  by  a  successful  enemy  since  the  conquest ;  solely  pro- 
tecting he/  military  and  naval  arsenals  by  perfect  and  well- 
garrisoned  works.  She  depends  mainly  for  defence  of  her  coast 
upon  her  navy,  and  the  warlike  spirit  of  her  yeomanry  ;  and  the 
very  absence  of  fortified  works  prevents  a  deceitful  reliance  upon 
such  defences,  and  keeps  alive  the  more  gallant  and  more  certain 
dependence  upon  their  own  personal  prowess." 

"And  thus  it  should  be  with  us.  Man  to  man,  the  Americans 
are  at  least  equal  to  any  other  race :  and  they  are  fully  capable 
of  driving  back  to  their  ships  or  capuring  any  number  of  troops 
that  might  have  the  termity  to  land  upon  our  soil." 

Lieutenant  Maury  says  :  "  Now  were  it  possible  for  an  enemy 
with  the  greatest  army  that  ever  was  led  into  battle  by  the 
greatest  captain,  to  take  the  country  by  surprise,  and  to  land  at 
Long  Island  Sound,  or  in  Lynn  Haven  bay,  and  to  be  disem- 
barking hfs  last  piece  of  artillery  before  he  was  discovered,  these 
railroads,  the  power  of  steam,  with  the  aid  of  lightning,  would 
enable  the  governmeiit,  before  he  could  reach  the  heights  of 


li  [Assembly 

Brooklyn,  or  the  outskirts  of  Norfolk,  to  have  there  in  waiting, 
and  ready  to  receive  him  and  beat  him  back  into  the  sea,  a  force 
two  to  one  greater  than  his,  however  strong." 

"Suppose  that  in  1847  there  had  been  in  active  operation,  be- 
tween Vera  Cruz  and  the  city  of  Mexico,  a  line  of  magnetic  tele- 
graph, and  such  a  railroad  as  is  the  Erie  road  of  New  York, — 
Can  it  be  supposed  that  our  generals,  being  cognizant  of  the  facts, 
would  have  so  much  as  entertained  the  idta  of  landing  there  as 
they  did,  and  laying  siege  to  the  town?" 

"  All  the  world  knows  where  our  railroads  are,  and  that  the 
Country  is  protected  from  military  surprise  and  invasion  from  the 
sea,  by  a  net- work  of  telegraphic  wires ;  the  mere  knowledge  of 
the  fact  that  Norfolk  and  New  York  can  bring  to  their  defence 
such  4-esources,  will  forever  prevent  the  thought  in  the  mind  of  an 
enemy  of  landing  in  force  at  Lynn  Haven  Bay,  or  on  Long 
Island." 

*'  Those,  roads,  therefore,  render  a  siege  to  any  of  the  works  of 
defence  before  those  places,  out  of  the  question." 

"To  lay  siege  to  any  place  along  our  sea-front  involves  not 
only  the  disembarking  of  an  army,  but  the  landing  also  of  the 
siege  train.    This  requires  time." 

"  From  the  time  that  the  head  of  our  invading  column  jumped 
out  of  the  boats  up  to  their  waists  in  the  water,  at  Vera  Cruz,  till 
General  Scott  Was  ready  to  send  his  summons  to  the  city,  was 
thirteen  days,  and  it  was  four  days  more  before  his  heavy  artil- 
lery drew  overtures  from  the  besieged, — total,  seventeen  days." 

"Imagine  an  army,  the  best  equipped,  it  may  be,  the  world 
eVer  sawj  that  should  attempt  to  beleaguer  one  of  our  strong- 
holds for  seventeen  days  1  Within  that  time,  we  could  bring 
against  him  by  railroads  and  steamboats,  millions  of  the  freemen 
which  this  cdUntry  evel*  holds  in  reserve  to  light  its  battles.  It 
might  be  Boston  before  which  this  imaginary  army  is  supposed 
to  sit  down  in  imaginary  siege ;  or  it  may  be  New  York,  Phila- 
delphia, Norfolk,  CharlestoUj  or  New  Orleans, — it  is  immaterial 
where.  In  less  thian  half  the  Yera  Cruz  time,  we  could  throw 
millions  of  men  into  any  one  of  these  places,  and  subsist  them,  in 
the  meantime,  by  a  daily  market-train  of  cars  and  steamboats 
catering  for  them  in  the  abundant  markets  of  the  Mississippi  Val- 
ley." 

"  It  is  impossible  that  any  army,  however  brave,  spirited,  and 
daring,  should  over  think  of  invading  a  country  like  this,  and  at; 


No.  58.]  13 

tacking  us  upon  our  own  ground,  when  we  have  under  our  com- 
mand such  powers  of  concentration,  and  such  force  in  reserve  as 
twenty  millions  of  freemen,  the  electric  telegraph,  the  railroad 
car,  the  locomotive,  and  the  steamboat."  . 

And  again,  alluding  to  an  invasion  of  Washington  :  "Now,  is 
it  not  obvious,  supposing  the  country  to  be  in  a  reasonable  state 
of  preparation  at  the  commencement  of  war — supposing  this  much 
— is  it  not  obvious,  by  sending  telegraphic  messages,  and  using 
the  powers  of  steam  for  conveyance,  the  American  general  might 
sight  down  here,  in  Washington,  and  at  daylight  the  next  morning 
commence  an  attack  upon  that  enemy,  both  in  front  and  in  rear, 
with  almost  any  amount  of  force,  consisting  of  regulars,  volun- 
teers, and  militia,  that  can  be  named  ?  Retreat  for  such  a  foe 
would  be  out  of  the  question,  and  re-embarkation  an  impossi- 
bility. 

"  Therefore,  so  far  as  the  system  of  1816  was  intended  to  defend 
the  country  from  invasion  along  the  Atlantic  sea-board,  steam, 
railroads,  and  the  telegraph,  have  rendered  it  as  effete  as  did  the 
invention  of  fire-arms  the  defences  which  the  military  science  of 
that  age  had  erected  against  the  shafts  of  the  archer.'- 

"Suppose  the  system  of  1816  to  have  been  completed  ;  that 
the  fortifications  therein  contemplated  had  all  been  built,  provis- 
ioned, eqijipped,  and  garrisoned.  Now,  saving  only  those  which 
protect  the  large  cities  from  the  guns  of  men-of-war,  suppose  the 
alternative  should  be  presented  to  our  military  men,  whether  they 
would  undertake  to  defend  the  country  from  invasion  with  such  a 
complete  system  of  fortifications,  but  without  the  assistance  of 
railroads,  steamers,  and  telegraph  ;  or  with  the  assistance  of  rail- 
roads, steamers,  and  telegraph,  but  without  the  aid  of  fortifica- 
tions. 

"  I  suppose,  could  such  an  alternative  be  submitted  to  every  of- 
ficer of  the  army,  from  the  oldest  down  to  the  youngest,  that 
there  would  be  but  one  answer,  and  that  would  be,  *  Down  with 
the  forts,  and  give  us  the  railroad,  the  locomotive,  the  steamboat, 
and  the  telegraph.' " 

But,  Lieutenant  Maury  does  not  dispense  entirely  with  forts; 
he  says  further,  *'  It  is  chiefly  to  keep  such  ships  {i.  e.,  ships  of 
war)  yVom  burning  our  cities  and  havens  within  reach  of  their 
broadsides,  that  we  want  forts  and  castles." 

Exactly  so.    It  is  just  for  that,  and  if  he  had  said  "  burning  our 


14  [Assembly 

cities  and  occupying  our  havens,"  (using  the  term  forts  and 
castles"  technically,)  I  might  almost  say,  only  that^  that  we  want 
them. 

But,  as  we  have  seen  before,  the  cry  "  Down  with  the  forts,  and 
give  us  the  railroad,  the  locomotive,  the  steamboat,  and  the  tele- 
graph," does  not  mean  "Down  with  all  forts,"  but  only  such  as 
we  do  not  want  to  protect  our  "  cities  and  havens  ;"  a  very  im- 
portant qualification  certainly. 

Furthermore,  he  says,  "  The  forts  already  completed,  or  well 
advanced  towards  completion,  are  believed  to  be  sufficient  for 
this."  At  the  date  this  was  written,  the  great  port  of  the  Pa- 
cific, San  Francisco,  had  not  a  fort  even  begun  ;  the  great  port 
and  commercial  metropolis  of  the  Atlantic,  New  York,  had  not 
on  its  great  avenue  of  approach,  the  Narrows,  works  at  all  capa- 
ble (see  the  opinion  of  Dahlgren,  a  brother  officer  of  the  navy, 
and  one  of  the  very  ablest  officers  of  the  navy,  printed  in  juxta- 
position to  Lieutenant  Maury's)  of  protecting  this  great  city  from 
"burning"  by  the  broadsides.or  curved  fire  of  ships  of  war.  But 
this  is  but  a  specimen  of  the  accuracy  and  soundness  of  criticism 
with  which  our  defensive  system  has  usually  been  assailed. 

Lieutenant  Maury,  however,  argues  that  "  if  one  gun,  in  open 
battery  on  the  shore,  *  whether  mounted  on  a  tower  or  not,'  be 
superior  to  '  one  or  two'  ships  of  war,  surely  our  seaport  towns 
of  second  and  third  rate  importance  (the  italics  are  mine)  may  safe- 
ly rely  upon  open  batteries  on  the  beach  to  protect  them  from 
*  British'  or  any  other  '  men-of-war.'  " 

I  make  one  more  citation  from  Lieutenant  Maury,  that  you  may 
compare  with  opinions  more  recently  expressed  : 

'  The  fortifications  of  the  coast,'  says  the  board  of  army  offi- 
cers, whose  able  report  of  1840  quieted  the  public  mind,  and 
fastened  for  ten  years  longer  upon  the  country  the  eff'ete  system 
of  1816,  '  The  fortifications  of  the  coast,'  say  they,  '  inusthQ  com- 
petent to  the  double  task  of  interdicting  the  passage  of  ships  and 
resisting  land  attacks — two  distinct  and  independent  qualities.  The 
first  demands  merely  an  array  in  suitable  numbers^  and  in  proper 
proportions^  of  heavy  guns,  covered  by  parapets,  proof  against  shot 
and  shells.''  " 

**  Now,  I  propose  to  show  that  the  railroads,  and  the  means  of 
locomotion  in  this  country,  sufficiently  defend  our  fortifications 
from  land  attacks  ;  and  that,  consequently,  the  principal  requisite 
henceforward  in  a  system  of  fortifications  for  the  coast,  is  merely 


No.  58.] 


15 


an  array,  in  suitable  numbers  and  proper  proportions,  of  heavy 
guns  along  the  beach,  to  cover  the  approaches  of  ships  from  sea 
to  seaport  towns."  And  particularly  I  call  your  attention  to  his 
recommendation,  "  That  no  further  expenses  be  incurred  for  pre- 
paring our  fortifications  along  the  Atlantic  sea-board  to  with- 
stand sieges  by  landJ^ 

Having  given,  I  think,  a  fair  view  of  the  arguments  of  the  ob- 
jecting naval  officers,  I  now  proceed  to  give  a  few  citations  from 
Major  Chase's  response.  As  an  engineer  officer  of  rank,  connected 
with  the  present  system  of  coast  defence  from  its  initiation,  his 
objections,  or  demand  for  modifications,  deserve  careful  consid- 
eration. 

After  giving  a  history  of  the  rise  and  progress  of  the  present 
system  of  coast-defence,  referring  to  the  experience  of  our  last 
war  with  Great  Britain,  reviewing  the  "  new  and  important  ele- 
ments in  the  national  defence  and  security  w^hich  have  been  rap- 
idly, almost  magically,  developed  in  the  last  thirty -five  years, 
such  as  the  increase  of  population,  the  progress  of  improvement 
in  agriculture,  manufactures  and  commerce,  and  in  facile  lines  of 
intercommunication,"  he  says  : 

"In  view,  then,  of  all  these  things,  and  especially  of  the  new 
elements — moral,  political,  and  physical — claimed  to  have  been 
developed,  and  to  have  greatly  increased  the  power  of  the  United 
States,  and  which  must  be  considered  in  relation  to  the  future  ar- 
rangement of  the  national  defence^  the  undersigned  thinks  that  the 
general  plan  adopted  thirty-five  years  ago  should  be  essentially 
modified,  by  reducing  the  number  and  size  of  the  works  proposed 
to  be  constructed,  and  by  abandoning  some  of  the  defences  now 
in  progress  of  construction,  or  which  are  about  to  be  constructed 
under  existing  appropriations  made  by  Congress." 

"  The  undersigned  is  also  of  the  opinion  that  the  best  interests 
of  the  country  require  that  the  subject  of  modification  should  be 
submitted  to  aboard,  composed  of  artillery  and  engineer  officers, 
and  some  eminent  civilians;  that  no  new  work  should  be  com- 
menced, even  if  it  has  been  appropriated  for  by  Congress  ;  and 
that  no  appropriation  should  be  made  by  Congress  for  the  com- 
pletion and  repairs  of  existing  works,  until  the  whole  subject  of 
the  national  defence  has  been  considered  and  reported  upon  by 
the  said  board."  And  he  further  advances  the  opinion,  "Suf- 
ficient has  been  said  to  show  that  railways  and  the  electric  tele- 
graph contribute  largely  to  the  national  defence  ;  th^t  the  works 


16 


[Assembly 


covering'  our  large  sea-ports,  and  other  important  points,  placed 
in  connection  with  the  railways  and  telegraph,  if  they  were  now 
to  be  constructed,  might  be  much  reduced  in  size  and  cost,  if  not 
in  number  ;  that  the  facility  with  which  these  works  could  be  re- 
lieved in"  case  of  an  attempted  siege,  would  have  rendered  it  only 
necessary  for  them  to  be  made  secure  against  a  coup-de-main.^' 

"  Under  these  views  of  the  subject,  it  is  at  once  perceived  that, 
whilst  the  extension  and  invention  of  railways  (and  the  electric 
telegraph)  do  not  supersede,  they  greatly  diminish  the  necessity 
of  adding  to  the  number  and  cost  of  the  fortifications  on  the  sea- 
board ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  future  prosecution  of  the 
system  of  defence  by  permanent  fortifications,  should  be  on  a  very 
reduced  scale  in  comparison  with  the  magnificent  one  adopted 
thirty-five  years  ago." 

And,  in  relation  to  the  influence  of  steam-navigation  and  im- 
provements in  artillery,  he  says  : 

"  The  navigation  of  the  ocean  by  steam,  and  the  application  of 
steam  to  vessels  of  war,  have  certainly  added  to  the  facilities  of 
naval  operations  in  making  attacks  and  transporting  troops. 
But  such  operations  are  necessarily  confined  to  short  lines,  like 
those  between  France  and  England,  in  the  Mediterranean,  or  on 
the  lakes  between  Canada  and  the  United  States." 

"  Attacks  by  steamers  can  only  be  formidable  when  they  are 
numerous,  and  filled  with  troops  destined  for  a  grand  attack ; 
but  when  they  are  thus  filled  with  troops,  munitions  of  war,  pro- 
visions, armament,  and  their  regular  crews,  little  room  is  left  for 
the  fuel  necessary  to  propel  them  to  the  scene  of  action  and  in 
retreat.  Such  steamers  cannot  be  propelled  either  conveniently 
or  rapidly  until  the  propelling  power  can  be  produced  at  a  less 
outlay  for  fuel.  At  the  rate  supposed  to  be  the  maximum  of 
speed  of  war  steamers,  lines  of  operations  over  one  thousand  miles 
(five  hundred  in  advance  and  five  hundred  in  retreat)  cannot  be 
occupied  advantageously,  or  with  the  efficiency  necessary  to  a 
great  movement  of  strategic  or  direct  attack.  Numerous  trans- 
ports would  be  necessary  to  convey  supplies  of  coal  to  conve- 
nient places  on  the  coast,  where  depots  for  the  same  would  have 
to  be  established  and  defended  at  great  cost,  for  they  would  be 
constantly  in  danger  of  attack  by  sea  and  land  by  enterprising 
assailants.  Besides,  the  great  loads  of  men,  munitions,  arma- 
ments, provisions,  and  fuel,  that  war  and  transport  steamers 
would  be  obliged  tQ  carry,  u^ultiply  the  d£i,ng§rs  of  navigation." 


No.  58.]  n 

Certainly,  steamers  could  make  sudden  and  brief  attempts  to 
enter  harbors  and  destroy  towns  ;  but  fast-sailing  ships,  with  fa- 
vorable winds,  could  do  the  same  if  this  kind  of  marauding  and 
piratical  warfare  was  carried  on  by  any  Christian  nation  calling 
itself  civilized,  and  if  not  opposed  by  the  same  machines  of  war 
as  those  used  by  the  enemy  and  by  acts  of  retaliation." 

"  Such  attempts  might  be  successful  in  attack  and  retreat  if 
made  in  the  night,  even  if  the  harbor  was  strongly  fortified,  if 
the  fortifications  were  unaided  by  rafts  and  hulks  lying  across 
the  channels." 

*'  But  a  demonstration  on  a  large  scale  against  the  important 
ports  and  arsenals,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  possession  and 
levying  contributions,  requires  considerable  land  forces,  even 
against  such  points  as  were  not  defended  by  batteries  ;  for  at 
such  points,  in  time  of  war,  earth  erections  would  be  made  and 
easily  supplied  with  cannon  of  heavy  calibre,  that  would  do  great 
damage,  by  direct  and  vertical  cannonade,  to  the  enemy's  vessels 
and  forces  afloat,  after  they  had  entered  the  harbor,  and  proba- 
bly compel  them  to  leave  it,  and  force  them  to  select  a  more 
distant  point  for  the  initiative  of  attack." 

If  the  enemy,  strong  in  ships  and  soldiers,  could  be  driven 
from  Boston  by  the  erection  of  some  redoubts  in  the  course  of 
one  night,  it  is  hardly  to  be  supposed  that  he  would  attempt  to 
recapture  i^e  position,  or  to  attack  any  other  position  similarly 
situated." 

"  Any  such  demonstration  at  the  present  day  would  be  checked 
by  the  means  just  enumerated,  and  be  met  on  its  flanks  and  in 
front  by  the  mobile  forces  rallied  by  the  telegraph  to  the  point 
of  attack." 

"  The  improvement  in  artillery,  as  regards  size  and  efiiciency, 
has  been,  of  late  years,  very  great  ;  but  it  inures  more  to  the 
benefit  of  the  defence  than  the  attack.  In  the  same  way  that,  if 
steam,  applied  to  ships  of  war,  aff'ords  any  advantages  to  the  at- 
tack, steam,  applied  on  railways,  combined  with  the  electric  tele- 
graph, affords  greater  advantages  to  the  defence,  by  reason  of 
the  greater  facility  with  which  forces  may  be  moved  by  the  lat- 
ter means." 

From  all  which  it  may  be  safely  asserted,  that  the  navigation 
of  the  ocean  by  steam,  the  application  of  steam  to  vessels  of  war, 
and  recent  improvements  in  artillery  and  other  military  inven- 
tions, do  not  exhibit  the  attack  of  forts  on  the  sea-board  superior 
[Assem.  No.  58.]  3 


18 


[Assembly 


to  the  defence,  when  those  forts  are  connected  with  railways,  and 
are  brought  within  succor  of  the  surrounding  population  ;  nor  do 
they  render  additions  to  the  present  fortifications  in  number,  size 
or  cost,  in  any  wise  necessary.  But,  on  the  contrary,  the  im- 
provement in  artillery,  if  those  fortifications  had  now  to  be  built, 
would  enable  their  plans  to  be  reduced  one-half'm  size,  and  the 
armament  one-fourth  in  amount." 

In  what  precedes,  I  believe,  I  have  given  a  fair  and  complete 
view  of  the  "objections  "  to  the  system  of  coast  defence,  as  they 
were  urged  scarcely  eight  years  ago.  I  do  not  pretend  that  our 
views  of  the  problem  of  coast  defence  should  be  exactly  the  same 
that  they  were  at  that  date ;  for  I  think,  in  relation  to  some  of 
our  great  sea-ports  at  least,  the  developments  of  the  recent  war 
of  the  Allies  against  Russia,  has  made  the  problem  quite  a  new 
one.  But  I  do  affirm  that  that  war  exhibited  but  a  development, 
or  realization  rather,  of  the  changes  which  form  the  basis  of 
these  criticisms  of  1851.  Let  us,  therefore,  sum  up  these  objec- 
tions of  1851. 

Our  forts  need  no  longer  be  so  large;  "  forts  and  castles  "  may 
even  be  dispensed  with,  and  a  few  powerful  guns,  "in  open  bat- 
teries," substituted.  The  idea  of  strength  against  land  attack 
(or  siege)  is  by  one  critic  scouted.  "Now,  were  it  possible  for 
an  enemy,  with  the  greatest  army  that  ever  was  led  into  battle, 
by  the  greatest  captain,  to  take  the  country  by  surprise,  and  to 
land  at  Long  Island  Sound  or  in  Lynn  Haven  Bay,  and  to  be  dis- 
embarking his  last  piece  of  artillery  before  he  was  discovered — 
these  railroads,  the  power  of  steam,  with  the  aid  of  lightning, 
would  enable  the  government,  before  he  could  reach  the  heights 
of  Brooklyn,  or  the  outskirts  of  Norfolk,  to  have  there  in  wait- 
ing, and  ready  to  receive  him,  and  beat  him  back  into  the  sea,  a 
force  two  to  one  greater  than  his,  however  strong."  While 
another  thinks  that  "  the  facility  with  which  these  works  could 
be  relieved,  in  case  of  an  attempted  siege,  would  have  rendered 
it  only  necessary  for  them  to  be  made  secure  against  a  coup  de 
main,^^  And  his  opinions,  as  to  "demonstrations  on  a  large 
scale,  against  the  important  ports  and  arsenals,"  will  be  found 
in  the  passage  already  quoted. 

I  pass  now  from  "  objections"  of  1851  to  "  objections"  of  1858. 
These  are  found  in  a  "Letter,"  addressed  to  yourself,  Sir,  by 
Lieutenant  Morton,  of  the  Engineers,  which  has  been  published, 
and  which,  as  it  appears  to  have  not  only  had  much  influence 


No.  58.] 


19 


upon  your  own  views,  but  on  the  minds  of  the  public,  deserves 
much  more  than  a  passing  notice.  They  are  summed  up  by  the 
author  in  the  following  language : 

"  The  first  objection  I  offer  to  the  existing  system  is  with 
respect  to  the  size.  It  adopts,  even  in  localities  where  there  is 
plenty  of  room,*  diflferent  sorts  of  masonry  casemated  castles,  of 
the  smallest  area  that  will  hold  the  number  of  guns  required,  in 
from  two  to  five  tiers;  the  guns  firing  through  embrasures  in  the 
scarp  wall,  which  is  exposed  to  its  base,  or  nearly  so,  to  the  fire 
of  flotillas.  This  remark  applies  to  the  sea  fronts  of  all  our 
sea-coast  forts  of  importance.  (Those  not  on  this  principle  are 
small,  and  situated  in  localities  where  one  sort  of  work  will 
answer  as  well  as  another.)  The  works  referred  to  have,  in 
some  cases,  land  fronts :  that  is,  fronts  which  do  not  bear  on  the 
approaches  of  ships,  or  on  anchorage  ground.  These  are  arranged 
sometimes  on  the  bastion  system,  sometimes  on  the  German ;  but 
in  all  cases  are  contracted  and  weak,f  owing  to  the  dijQ&cultyJ  of 
joining  strong  land  fronts  to  casemated  sea  fronts,  of  small 
development." 

"  The  small  area  of  these  works  will  prevent  them,  in  the  first 
place,  from  holding  any  more  ammunition  and  stores  than  they 
will  need  if  exposed  to  protracted  bombardment.  As  to  a  siege, 
those  which  are  out  of  the  reach  of  help,  such  as  Key  West, 
Fort  Point,#8hip  Island  and  Pensacola,  will,  probably,  be  short 
of  supplies  very  soon,  and  be  reduced  from  that  cause.  There 
will  be,  in  no  case,  the  interior  space  required  to  accommodate  the 
magazines,  &c.,  which  must  be  located  and  protected,  at  the 
points  I  have  specified,  and  where  the  plan  of  fortification  is  still 
to  be  decided  upon." 

*'  A  second  disadvantage  springing  from  the  contracted  area 
is,  that  there  is  not  enough  room  on  the  terrepleins  to  spare  for 
temporary  bombproofs,  traverses,  <fcc.,  which  are  necessary  to 
protect  the  barbettee  guns  from  the  ricochet  and  reverse  fire,  and 
vertical  fire.  Also,  the  garrison,  as  well  as  the  guns,  will  be 
closely  packed,  and  during  a  bombardment  the  chances  of  casu- 

*  ^'As  at  Key  West,  Ship  Island,  Fort  Point,  Pensacola,  the  site  of  Fort  Tompkins, 
and  Fort  Richmond,  at  Sandy  Hook,  Fort  Adams,  and  other  places." 
■j-  "  Without  any  exception,  they  are  smaller  than  a  Vauban  front." 

j  "  In  illustration  of  this,  see  Forts  Adams  and  Schuyler,  in  each  of  which  two  sides  of 
the  main  work  are  flanked  by  flanking  casemates  in  the  outworks.  This  arrangement  is 
certainly  open  to  criticism ;  but  I  mention  it  only  to  show  that  it  has  been  found  diSicult 
to  connect  the  sea  and  land  fronts;  and  I  wish  it  to  be  understood,  that  I  do  not  find  fault 
■with  the  plan  of  these  works,  but  only  object  to  this  plan  being  followed  hereafter,  now 
that  it  appears  to  be  unsuitable  to  circumstances  that  have  arisen  since  they  were  built." 


20  [Assembly 

alties  will  be  increased  from  this  cause ;  and  from  the  fact  that 
the  heads  of  the  casemate  arches  being  open  on  the  interior,  and 
having  a  direction  towards  a  common  centre,  more  fragments  of 
a  single  shell,  bursting  inside  the  work,  will  probably  enter 
them,  than  if  they  were  developed  on  longer  lines.'' 

"  3d.  Works  built  on  this  system  expose  a  large  mark  to  the  fire 
of  flotillas,*  which  can  hardly  be  missed ;  and  a  certain  propor-  * 
tion  of  the  entire  number  of  shots  must,  therefore,  be  counted  upon 
to  enter  the  embrasures,  carrying  with  them  splinters  of  stone.'' 

"  Those  shots  which  do  not  hit  the  embrasures  will  produce  a 
certain  effect  in  shaking  the  wall ;  and,  considering  the  calibres 
and  number  of  the  guns  that  enter  into  the  armament  of  a 
modern  flotilla,  there  is  reason  to  fear  breaching."f 

"It  must  be  noted,  also,  that  a  small  front  is  exposed  to  a 
morq  converging  fire  than  a  large  one ;  a  point  of  importance, 
according  to  all  military  authorities." 

*'  4th.  The  use  of  casemates  brings  one  tier  of  guns  about  at  the 
level  of  the  ground,  or  site ;  and  in  those  cases  where  a  ditch 
cannot  be  made  to  surround  the  work  (as  is  the  case,  for  exam- 
ple, at  Fort  Adams,  Fort  Schuyler,  Fort  Sumter,  Fort  Indepen- 
dence, Fort  Hamilton,  and  others),  the  defect  results  that  an 
entrance  may  be  effected  by  the  enemy  by  surprise,  or  under 
certain  other  circumstance,  by  these  embrasures.  [It  appears 
that  the  southern  tower  at  Bomarsund  was  entered,  and  taken 
by  a  small  party  of  French,  who  entered  through  the  embrasures, 
though  all  the  garrison  had  not  yet  retreated  from  it  into  the 
keep.]  The  iron  shutters,  recently  proposed,  will  not  entirely 
remove  this  defect,  which  is  inherent  to  small  fronts. 

"  5th.  The  present  system  is  carried  out  to  advantage  only  on 
sites  close  to  the  water ;  and  hence,  in  many  cases,  the  advan- 
tages offered  by  the  nature  of  commanding  plateaus  or  promon- 
tories have  been  neglected,  and  works  built  at  the  foot  of  heights, 
even  when  an  artificial  site  was  necessary  for  the  purpose."J 

*  "  M.  Richild  Grivel  (1857)  is  of  opinion  that,  considering  the  greater  calibre  and 
force  of  the  sea-service  guns  recently  adopted,  and  the  comparative  safety  afforded  them 
by  floating  batteries,  no  isolated  masonry  fort,  however  solidly  constructed,  can  long  resist 
an  attack  properly  conducted." 

t  "It  is  certain  that  the  scarps  of  our  sea-coast  works  are  no  stronger  than  those  of 
Bomarsund;  brick  walls  of  eight  feet  thickness,  or  the  same  backed  with  concrete,  or 
granite  backed  with  concrete,  form  our  scarps,  which  are  three  feet  thinner  around  each 
embrasure,  and  are,  in  many  cases,  not  bonded  to  the  counterfeits  in  the  rear.  I  do  not 
tissert  that  the  walls  of  Bomarsund  were  breached  from  the  water,  but  refer  back  for  a  com- 
parison between  large  guns  afloat  and  small  ones  ashore,  to  show  that  a  less  accurate  fire, 
provided  it  is  from  heavier  guns,  will  eflfoct  a  breach." 

I  "  As  at  Fort  Adams,  Fort  Richmond,  Fort  Point,  and  others." 


No.  58.]  21 

A  system  of  fortifications,  or  of  anything  else,  which  requires 
time  and  money  to  construct,  and  which,  when  constructed,  are 
intended  to  last  for  years,  must  have  more  flexibility  than  ordi- 
narily belongs  to  works  of  this  nature,  if  it  can  meet  the  views 
of  objectors,  who,  in  the  brief  space  of  seven  years,  on  the  one 
hand,  scout  the  idea  of  land  defence  entirely,  or  denounce  our 
works  as  too  strong  in  this  particular ;  and  on  the  other,  criti- 
cise these  land  defences  as  "weak  and  contracted." 

I  do  not  exactly  understand  what  Lieutenant  Morton's  remedy 
is  for  all  these  alleged  evils  ;  for,  though  he  has  proposed  a  "  sys- 
tem^' of  "  detached  bastions,"  connected  by  earthen  curtains,  the 
"smallest  application  of  which  would  be  a  pentagon  of  550  yards 
a  side,  and  the  largest  sizes  being  polygons  of  750  yards  a  side," 
he  himself  records,  without  answering  the  objection,  "  that  the 
extent  of  ground  occupied  by  the  inclosure  is  too  great  for  some 
of  the  sites  which  are  available  for  the  location  of  batteries  ;" 
and  moreover  states  expressly,  "It  must  be  recollected  that  I 
propose  to  fortify  in  this  manner  only  certain  points  of  the  sea- 
coasts,  which  I  mention,  and,  in  view  of  future  cases,  define  the 
nature  of;"  and  his  specification  and  definition  is  as  follows  : 

"  I  propose  that  the  system  sketched  in  the  preceding  discus- 
sion should  be  used  at  Key  West,  Ship  Island,  San  Francisco, 
possibly  at  Pensacola,  and  at  other  or  future  points  of  United 
States  territory,  which  are  comprised  in  the  following  class,  or 
classes,  viz  :  places  that  are  fitted  by  nature  to  form  bases  of  op- 
erations for  sea  w^arfare,  by  being  located  where  they  may  pro- 
tect our  commerce,  and  from  which  that  of  the  enemy  may  be 
annoyed  ;  that  are  convenient  places  of  retreat  for  repairs  or 
safety  for  government  ships  and  for  privateers,  or  merchantmen 
pursued  by  the  enemy;  that  can  be  made  also  safe  and  conve- 
nient depots  for  artillery,  ammunition  and  stores ;  or  places  that 
may,  in  addition  to  some  or  all  of  the  above  properties,  be  made 
centres  of  defence  from  land,  as  well  as  sea  attacks,  of  territories 
isolated  or  distant  from  the  United  States." 

Neither  the  specification  nor  the  definition  apply  to  more  than 
an  exceedingly  small  portion  of  the  "  sites"  requiring  sea-coast 
batteries,  while  the  objection  that  he  records  applies  to  most  of 
them.  If,  therefore,  the  objections  made  to  the  "  dififerent  sorts 
of  masonry  casemated  castles"  are  valid,  we  find  no  substitute  in 
his  essay,  and  however  forcible  the  objections  may  be,  until  some- 
thing better  is  proposed  or  invented,  we  must  be  content  with 


22 


[Assembly 


them  ;  for  I  shall  show  hereafter  that  "  masonry  casemated  cas- 
tles" have  played  a  great  part  in  preserving  sea-ports,  commer- 
cial and  naval  depots  (the  true  and  proper  objects  of  coast  de- 
fence) from  destruction — that  they  have  fulfilled  completely  the 
objects  for  which  they  were  constructed. 

Let  us  examine  the  subject  a  little  more  closely.  Years  ago  it 
had  passed  into  a  proverb  in  France  that  a  gun  on  shore  is 
worth  a  ship  at  sea,"*  and  the  French  "  Aide-memoire  d'artil- 
lerie"  expresses  the  same  idea  in  other  words  :  "  That  a  battery 
of  four  pieces  of  large  calibre,  well  placed  and  well  served,  ought 
to  get  the  better  [avoir  raison]  of  a  ship  of  120  guns." 

But  the  question,  which  of  the  two  will  "  get  the  better"  in  a  • 
direct  contest,  is  a  very  different  one  from  that  which  concerns 
the  mere  rapid  passage  of  a  ship  or  steamer  through  a  channel  de- 
fended by  a  battery ;  and  it  is,  I  think,  in  overlooking  in  a 
measure  this  important  distinction  that  Lieutenant  Maury,  and 
many  others,  arguing  from  the  surprising  results  of  certain  well- 
known  contests  between  very  small  open  batteries  and  ships,  have 
proposed,  instead  of  stone  batteries,  "  one  or  more  heavy  guns 
planted  in  open  battery  along  the  beach." 

Even  if  it  was  admitted  that  the  fire  of  a  gun  in  an  "  open  bat- 
tery" was  necessarily  so  much  more  effective  (which  I  greatly 
doubt)  than  that  of  onie  in  a  casemate,  it  may  be  remarked  that 
as  (in  the  present  state  of  artillery)  it  is,  at  best,  but  one  out  of 
great  many  shots  that  touches  a  ship  in  a  vital  part,  or  sets  her 
on  fire ;  Sifew  guns  cannot  be  expected  to  prevent  the  passage  of 
a  fleet,  nor  even  of  a  single  vessel. 

I  have  said  already  that  no  battery,  or  system  of  batteries,  has 
yet  been  invented  which  shall  seal  hermetically  a  channel  (like 
the  Narrows,  for  instance,)  the  passage  of  which  offers  to  an  en- 
terprising enemy  an  object  sufficient  to  induce  him  to  run  the  risk 
at  all  hazards.  What,  then,  can  be  done  ?  We  must,  to  defend 
such  a  passage,  use  only  guns  of  the  most  destructive  capacities  ; 
and  we  must  multiply  them,  so  that  we  can  throj;v  upon  him  a  per- 
fect hail-storm  of  fire  throughout  his  whole  path  ;  and  we  must 
leave  no  spot  either  in  approaching  his  object,  or  after  he  gets  be- 
fore it,  not  under  our  fire  ;  and  even  then  we  must,  in  many  cases, 
call  in  auxiliary  aid. 

Again,  with  regard  to  the  open  battery,  this  peculiar  efficiency 
which  Lieutenant  Maury  attributes  to  it  does  not  belong  to  it  at 

*  ''Vn  canon  k  terre  vaut  un  vaisseau  a  la  mer." 


No.  58.]  23 

all,  except  in  certain  sites,  which  cannot  always,  nor  even  fre- 
quently, be  found. 

Lieutenant  Dahlgren  says  :  "So  far,  therefore,  as  casemated 
batteries  are  concerned,  shells  have  added  very  little  to  the  pow- 
er of  ships ;  but  against  guns  cn  barbette  they  will  be  found  of 
material  assistance,  especially  if  charged  with  balls  and  used  as 
shrapnel.  And  against  open  works,  the  concentration  afforded 
by  the  well-served  broadsides  of  one  or  more  ships,  should  suffice 
to  silence  the  works  if  the  vessels  have  no  unusual  disadvantages 
to  encounter,  and  are  brought  within  sure  distance."  And  again, 
in  his  very  interesting  and  able  remarks  on  the  "  Incidents  of  the 
War,"  at  the  conclusion  of  his  work  on  "  Shells  and  Shell  Guns 

"  The  fire  of  a  small  barbette,  or  uncovered  work,  can  always 
be  kept  under  by  the  rifled  musket  and  shrapnel,  judiciously 
posted,  taking  the  advantage  of  such  shelter  as  the  locality  af- 
fords, or  using  pits  for  the  sharp-shooters  if  necessary.  The 
broadside  can  then  be  brought  to  bear,  or  the  men  sent  ashore 
in  force  to  assamlt.  Circumstances  may  even  admit  of  the  land- 
ing one  or  two  cannon  to  breach  the  work. 

The  unqualified  assumption  that  a  tower  or  small  redoubt, 
with  its  two  or  three  guns,  can  of  itself  make  good  the  defence 
against  a  heavy  ship,  would  naturally  suggest  more  than  is  con- 
templated ;  for  in  that  case,  why  resort  to  the  cost  of  extensive 
works  to  defend  a  harbor,  when  a  few  towers  might  fully  answer 
the  purpose?  But  the  fact  is,  that  the  advantage  of  site  which 
is  required  to  give  effect  to  this  species  of  defence,  is  rarely  to  be 
found  just  where  it  is  needed.  It  existed  neither  at  Cronstadt  nor 
at  Sweaborg ;  and  at  Sebastopol  the  elevated  works  of  this  nature 
only  served  to  command  the  position  for  attack  on  Fort  Constan- 
tine  from  seaward.  Of  themselves,  they  could  not  have  prevent- 
ed the  entrance  of  a  single  vessel  into  the  port,  nor  have  inflicted 
any  material  damage  on  an  enemy  making  the  attempt. 

"  Again,  it  frequently  happens  that  the  works  are  too  limited 
in  extent,  or  isolated  and  not  capable  of  mutual  support  ;  the 
masonry  may  be  bad,  the  site  low,  and  the  guns  unprotected  by 
casemates,  the  ordnance  of  inefficient  power  and  not  commanding 
all  accessible  positions,  the  garrison  inadequate  in  numbers  and 
quality.  In  such  cases  the  ship  cannot  fail  to  have  the  ad- 
vantage, and  it  only  remains  to  use  it  by  attacking  in  proper 
force,  rapidly  and  energetically,  concentrating  the  full  fire  of  the 
line  at  decisive  distances  upon  the  unguarded  or  weak  points, 


24 


[Assembly 


and  affording  no  opportunity  for  improving  the  state  of  the 
works.  Under  this  head  may  be  classed  those  actions  where 
ships  have  been  eminently  successful — Algiers,  Acre,  Yera  Cruz, 
Kinburn,  Petropauloski,"  &c.,  &c. 

Even  if  the  advantages  of  site"  existed,  a  small  number  of 
guns  would  not  always  answer  the  purpose.  The  whole  jront  of 
the  'public  lands  on  Staten  Island,  at  the  Narrows,  is  (or  will  be) 
girdled  by  open  earthen  batteries,  but  it  is  not  enough — nor  would 
I  trust  these  open  batteries  alone^  if  they  could  contain  guns 
enough. 

Grivel^  (who  is  quoted  as  entertaining  the  opinion  that  "  no 
isolated  masonry  fort,  however  solidly  constructed,  can  long  re- 
sist an  attack  properly  conducted,")  uses  the  following  language  : 
We  could  then"  (he  refers  to  the  case  in  which  the  site  is  low 
and  ships  can  approach  near),  "  if  we  feared  being  commanded 
or  taken  in  enfilade  by  fires  of  ships,  substitute  for  earthen  bat- 
teries, works  in  masonry,  casemated,  and  with  several  stories  of 
covered  fires.  [The  italics  are  mine.]  This  kind  of  fortification 
will  expose,  it  is  true,  its  '  personnel'  to  the  chance  of  embrasure 
shot,  or  to  wounds  from  stona  fragments,  (as  if  any  warlike 
structure  had  yet  been  invented  in  which  there  was  no  danger) 
and  its  material  to  that  of  a  breach  ;  but  these  inconvenieaces 
will  be  in  part  compensated  by  the  assured  protection^  to  the 
greater  part  of  its  artillery,  from  the  plunging  or  enfilading  fires 
of  ships."  An  "  assured  protection  to  the  greater  part  of  its  ar- 
tillery" is  certainly  a  great  object  attained  by  "this  kind  of  forti- 
fication," and  it  doubtless  would  be  able  longer  "  to  resist  an  at- 
tack properly  conducted"  than  a  work  which,  like  Kinburn,  had 
no  such  assured  protection. 

Let  me  now  allude  to  objections  applying  particularly  to  these  i 
kind  of  works ;  and^r^^  as  to  this  liability  to  breaching  here  hint- 
ed at  by  Grivel,  and  urged  again  by  Lieutenant  Morton,  who  re- 
fers to  Grivel's  authority  and  opinions.  There  is  not  one  single 
fact  on  record  derived  from  the  numerous  attacks  of  the  Allies 
on  Russian  "  casemated  castles"  (and  they  presented  themselves 
to  the  Allied  fleets  almost  everywhere,  and  with  all  that  consti- 
tutes the  "  objections"  to  this  class  of  works  in  their  most  glaring 
form),  nor  in  the  history  of  any  other  maritime  attacks  on  forti- 

*  La  Marine  dans  I'attaque  des  fortifications  etle  bombardement  des  villes  du  littoral,*' 
par  M.  Richild  Grivel,  Lieutenant  de  Vaisseau :  Paris,  1856.  His  opinion"  is  worth  as 
much  as  any  other  iudividual's,  perhaps.  We  shall  see  hereafter  on  what  grounds  such 
Qpinions  ar«  founded. 


No.  58.] 


25 


fications,  to  justifiy  this  fear.  The  only  event  of  the  war  which 
gives  any  apparent  ground  for  it,  is  the  attack  on  Kinburn. 

To  draw  any  conclusion  from  this  affair,  it  is  necessary  to  un- 
derstand the  character  of  the  works  which  had  to  oppose  the  tre- 
mendous armament  arrayed  against  them.  GrivePs  account  of 
them  conveys  a  ver}^  erroneous  impression.  He  says  :  "  The  cit- 
adel of  Kinburn,  built  upon  a  tongue  of  sand,  could  be  ranked  in 
the  category  of  those  kiasonry-casemated  works  for  which  the 
Russians  seem  to  manifest  a  preference  for  the  defence  of  insular 
positions  or  of  such  low  sites.  This  fort,  armed  upon  all  its 
faces,  offered  an  incomplete  tier  of  covered  fires,  surmounted  by 
a  long  barbette  battery  with  earthen  parapets  ;  its  armament 
amounted  to  more  than  sixty  guns  (bouches  a  feu),  of  which, 
about  half  bore  upon  the  open  sea.  Two  new  batteries,  armed, 
one  with  ten,  the  other  with  eleven  pieces,  and  covered  with  sand 
parapets,  were  located  beyond  on  the  extreme  point,  and  comple- 
ted, in  concert  with  those  of  the  other  shore,  the  defence  of  the 
pass  of  Otchakow.'' 

One  would  imagine  from  this,  that  we  had  here  a  very  perfect 
specimen  of  Russian  works  and  of  sea-coast  defences  generally; 
that  the  "  masonry-casemated  works"  were  such  as  set  at  defiance, 
before  Cronstadt,  the  united  maritime  power  of  France  and 
England. 

Lieutenant  Morton  appears  to  draw  his  account  of  Kinburn  en- 
tirely from  Grivel  (adding,  however,  quite  gratuitously,  "a  cer- 
tain proportion  of  sixty-pounder  gujis^^  to  the  armament  of  these 
(supposed)  formidable  works.) 

Having  arranged  his  works,  Grivel  disposes  of  them  as  follows  : 

"The  contest  had  lasted  /o2^r  hours,  and,  during  this  short 
space  of  time,  the  combined  fires  of  our  cannon  of  great  penetra- 
tion, and  of  our  mortars,  had  sufficed  to  put  the  place  out  of 
condition  (hors  d'etat)  to  resist  longer.  Represent  to  yourself  all 
its  cannon  dismounted,  practicable  breaches  in  the  sea-front,  all 
its  edifices  burnt  or  in  ruins !  In  a  word,  the  fort  of  Kinburn 
was,  after  the  picturesque  expression  of  our  sailors,  capsized 
{chavire  de  fond  en  coinble),  and  if  its  entire  garrison  was  not 
buried  under  this  complete  disaster  of  the  defences  (son  materiel), 
it  is  because  the  soldiers  not  employed  at  the  pieces  had  been 
sheltered  in  the  casemates,  of  which  a  portion,  resisting  our 
bombs,  had  remained  intact.'^ 

[Assem.  No.  58. J  4 


[Assembly 


So,  tlie  men  in  the  "  casemates"  fared  rather  better  than  those 
serving  barbette  guns  (open  batteries),  with  which  our  modern 
critics  are  so  exclusively  in  love  ;  and  had  they  been  gun-case- 
mates^ well  arranged  and  well  constructed,  it  is  likely  that  the 
comparative  security  would  have  been  about  the  same. 

But  let  us  contrast  this  imposing  account  of  the  works,  and  the 
somewhat  terrific  exposition  of  the  result,  with  the  actual  facts.* 

Dahlgren,  drawing  his  information  from  "  official  accounts  by 
English  and  French  Admirals,"  describes  the  works  and  their  lo- 
cation as  follows  : 

"  The  Boug  and  the  Dnieper  issue  into  a  large  basin,  formed 
partly  by  the  projection  of  the  main  shore,  partly  by  a  long  nar- 
row strip  of  sand  beach,  which  continues  from  it  and  takes  a 
northwesterly  direction,  until  it  passes  the  promontory  of  Otcha- 
kov,  where  it  terminates,  and  from  which  it  is  separated  by  the 
channel  whereby  the  waters  of  the  estuary  empty  into  the  Black 
Sea. 

*•  The  distance  between  the  spit  or  extremity  of  this  tongue 
and  the  Point  of  Otchakov,  or  the  main  shore  opposite,  is  about 
two  miles  ;  but  the  water  is  too  shoal  to  admit  of  the  passage  of 
large  vessels  of  war,  except  in  the  narrow  channel  that  runs 
nearest  to  the  spit  and  its  northern  shore.  Here,  therefore,  are 
placed  the  works  designed  to  command  the  entrance.  They  are 
three  in  number.  Near  the  extreme  point  of  the  spit  is  a  covered 
battery,  built  of  logs,  which  are  filled  in  and  overlaid  with  sand, 
pierced  for  eighteen  guns,  but  mounting  only  ten. 

"  Advancing  further  along  the  beach  is  a  circular  redoubt, 
connected  with  the  spit  battery  by  a  covered  way.  This  work, 
built* of  stone,  and  reveted  with  turf,  is  open,  and  said  to  be  the 
most  substantial  of  the  three  ;  it  has  eleven  cannon,  and  within 
is  a  furnace  for  heating  shot. 

"  Further  on,  and  where  the  beach  has  widened  considerably, 
is  Fort  Kinburn,  a  square,  bastioned  work,  extending  to  the  sea 
on  the  south,  and  to  the  w^aters  of  the  estuary  on  the  north.  It 
is  casemated  in  part,  though  but  few  of  these  embrasures  were 
armed — its  chief  force  being  in  the  pieces  en  barbette  and  some 
nine  or  ten  mortars.  The  masonry,  though  solid,  is  represented 
by  an  eye-witness  not  to  be  bomb-proof,  and  so  dilapidated  by 

*The  author  of  Chambers'  Pictorial  History  of  the  Russian  war,  says  of  Kinburn  :  *'  The 
fort  at  that  place  had  been  so  little  attended  to  by  the  Eussians,  that  an  English  lieuten- 
ant had  some  time  previously  oflfered  to  seize  and  blow  it  up  if  he  had  three  hundred  men 
to  aid  him;  but  when  the  Russians  saw  the  English  steamers  cruising  about,  they  began  to 
strengthen  the  fort  and  augment  the  garrison,"  &c. 


No.  58.]  27 

age  that  the  mortar  was  falling  out  from  the  interstices,  leaving 
the  stone  to  disintegrate.  The  interior  space  was  occupied  bv 
ranges  of  wooden  buildings,  slightly  constructed,  and  plastered 
over. 

"  This  fort  is  said  to  be  armed  with  sixty  pieces.  The  English 
admiral  states  that  all  three  of  the  works  mounted  eighty-one 
guns  and  mortars.  The  calibres  are  not  given  officially,  but  sta- 
ted in  private  letters  to  be  18-pounders  and  32-pounders." 

The  above  description  will,  I  think,  quite  justify  the  further 
remark  as  to  these  works : 

"  Thej  were  inferior  in  every  respect,  and  manifestly  incapa- 
ble of  withstanding  any  serious  operation  by  sea  or  land.  The 
main  fort  was  particularly  weak  in  design,  and  dilapidated ;  all 
of  them  were  indifferently  armed  and  garrisoned." 

So  much  for  the  works.  As  to  the  character  of  the  armament* 
brought  to  the  assault,  the  same  authority  says : 

"  The  Allied  force  was  admirably  adapted  to  the  operation, 
embracing  every  description  of  vessel,  from  the  largest  to  the 
smallest,  and  all  propelled  by  steam.  They  were  screw-liners, 
and  like  vessels  of  inferior  class,  side-wheel  steamers,  screw  gun- 
boats, floating-batteries,  mortar-vessels,  &c.,  each  armed  in  what 
was  considered  the  most  approved  manner.''  And  this  truly  for- 
midable naval  force  carried  besides  "  some  thousand  troops"  on 
board,  all  (Resigned  to  attack  these  "  dilapidated"  works  of  Kin- 
burn. 

Without  going  into  the  particulars,  I  will  simply  give  Dahl- 
gren's  account  of  the  affair  : 

"  The  French  floating-batteries  {Devastation^  Lave  and  Ton- 
nante  steamed  in  to  make  their  first  essay,  anchoring  some  six  or 
seven  hundred  yards  off  the  S.  E.  bastion  of  Fort  Kinburn,  and 
at  9.20  opened  fire,  supported  by  the  mortar-vessels,  of  which 
six  were  English,  by  the  gunboats,  five  French  and  six  English, 
and  by  the  steamer  Odin,  16." 

"  The  heavy  metal  of  the  floating  batteries  (said  to  be  twelve 
50-pounders  on  the  broadside  of  each)  soon  told  on  the  walls  of 
the  fort;   and  the  vertical  fire  was  so  good  that  the  French 

*I  find  no  detailed  statement  of  the  total  number  of  vessels,  ^uns,  troops,  <fec.,of  the 
Allied  force.  The  "  Pictorial  History"  gives  the  following  as  the  English  quota,  viz.  :  "  6 
steam  line-of-battle  ships,  17  steam  frigates  and  sloops,  10  gun-boats,  6  mortar-vessels,  3 
steam-tenders,  10  transports — making  52  vessels,  carrying  in  all  about  1,500  guns,  and 
5,000  troops  of  all  kinds." 

The  French  force  is  not  stated ;  but  there  were  4  ships  of  the  line,  a  number  of  steam- 
vessels  and  gun-boats,  besides  the  3  famous  floating-batteries  (here  first  employed),  and  a 
considerable  body  of  troops.  The  troops  of  both  nations  were  landed  previous  to  the  naval 
attack,  and  the  place  invested  by  land. 


v28  ^  [Assembly 

admiral  attributed  to  it,  in  great  part,  the  speedy  surrender  of 
the  place.  The  gun-boats  also  made  good  ricochet  practice, 
which  was  noticed  to  be  severe  on  the  barbette  batteries." 

"  The  Russian  gunners,  in  nowise  daunted  by  this  varied  fire, 
plied  their  guns  rapidly  in  return,  directing  their  attention 
chiefly  to  the  floating-batteries,  which  were  nearest. 

"  Exactly  at  noon,  the  admirals  steamed  in  with  the  Royal 
Albert,  121,  Algiers,  91,  Agamemnon,  90,  and  Princess  Royal, 
90,  with  the  four  French  liners  in  close  order,  taking  position  in 
line,  ranging  N.  W.  and  S.  E.,  about  one  mile  from  the  fort,  in 
twenty-eight  feet  water/' 

"At  the  same  time,  a  squadron  of  steam  frigates,*  under  Rear- 
Admirals  Stewart  and  Pellion,  dashed  in  through  the  passage  to 
the  basin,  opening  fire  on  the  spit  and  central  batteries  in  pass- 
ing, and  anchoring  well  inside  of  Fort  Nicholaiev  and  Otchakov. 
The  attack  seaward  was  completed  by  the  Acre,  100,  Cura^oa 
$0,  Tribune,  30,  and  Spkynx,  6,  opening  on  the  central  battery ; 
while  the  Hannibal,  91,  Dauntless,  24,  and  Terrible,  21,  assailed 
that  on  the  spit.  To  this  storm  of  shot  and  shells,  the  Russians 
could  not  reply  long.  In  the  spit  battery,  the  sand  falling 
through  between  the  logs,  displaced  by  shot  and  shells,  choked 
the  embrasures,  and  blocked  up  the  guns.  In  the  fort,  the  light 
wooden  buildings  were  in  flames  at  an  early  hour  j  then  the  walls 
began  to  crumble  before  the  balls  which  came  from  every  quar- 
ter, front,  flank  and  rear ;  and  as  the  guns  were  disabled  suc- 
cessively, the  return  became  feeble,  until  few  were  in  condition 
to  be  fired,  the  central  redoubt  alone  discharging  single  guns  at 
long  intervals.  The  Russian  commander,  however,  made  no  sign 
of  surrender ;  but  the  admirals,  seeing  that  his  fire  had  ceased, 
and  further  defence  was  unavailing,  hoisted  the  white  flag  at 
1.35  F.  M.,  upon  which  the  works  were  given  up  on  honorable 
terms." 

"  The  garrison  consisted  of  about  fourteen  hundred  men  ;  their 
loBS  is  differently  stated, — the  French  admiral  says  eighty 
wounded, — another,  forty-three  killed  and  one  hundred  and 
fourteen  wounded." 

*'  The  English  suffered  the  least,  having  but  two  men  wounded, 
besides  two  killed  and  two  wounded  in  the  Arrow,  by  the  burst- 
ing of  her  two  68-pounder  Lancaster  guns." 

*  Valorous,  16,  Furious,  16,  Sidon,  22,  Leopard,  12,  Gladiator,  4,  Firebrand,  6,  Strom- 
holi,  6,  Spiteful,  6,  Asmodee,  Cacique  and  Sane. 


I 


No.  58.]  29 

*'  The  superiority  of  the  Allied  vessels  in  number  and  calibro 
of  ordnance  was  very  decided ;  they  must  have  had  at  least  six 
hundred  and  fifty  pieces  in  play,  chiefly  32-pounders,  and  8-inch 
shell  guns,  with  a  fair  proportion  of  68-pounders  and  mortars, 
besides  the  50-pounders  of  the  French  floating-batteries.  To 
which  the  Russians  could  only  reply  with  eighty-one  cannon 
and  mortars,  and  no  guns  of  heavier  calibre  than  32-pounders, 
while  many  were  lower.  The  great  disparity  in  offensive  power 
was  not  compensated  to  the  works  by  the  advantage  of  com- 
manding position,  the  Russian  fort  and  redoubt  being  upon 
nearly  the  same  level  with  the  ships'  batteries,  and  also  very 
deficient  in  proper  strength.  On  the  other  hand,  the  depth  of 
water  did  not  allow  the  liners  to  approach  nearer  than  one  mile ; 
and  thus  their  fire  was  by  no  means  so  intense  as  it  would  have 
been  at  shorter  range." 

"  This  was  the  sole  occasion  in  which  the  floating-batteries  had 
an  opportunity  of  proving  their  endurance  ;  which  was  the  ques- 
tion of  most  importance,  as  no  one  could  doubt  the  efiect  of  long 
50-pounders,  or  68-pounders,  when  brought  within  a  few  hun- 
dred yards  of  masonry,  and  able  to  retain  the  steadiness  indis- 
pensable to  a  breaching  fire." 

"No  siege  operation  had  ever  embraced  batteries  of  such 
power,' for  though  the  English  had  employed  long  68-pounders  at 
Sevastopolj^et  the  distance  from  the  objects  exceeded  a  thousand 
yards ;  and  the  concentration  of  fire,  so  far  as  any  opinion  can 
be  formed  from  the  published  statements,  was  far  inferior  to 
that  of  the  thirty-sis:  50-pounders,  in  the  broadsides  of  the  three 
batteries  anchored  in  close  order." 

"  They  were  hulled  repeatedly  by  shot ;  one  of  them  (the 
Devastation),  it  is  said,  sixty-seven  times,  without  any  other 
efiect  on  the  stout  iron  plates  than  to  dint  them,  at  the  most,  one 
and  a  half  inches, — still,  there  were  ten  men  killed  and  wounded 
in  this  battery  by  shot  and  shell  which  entered  the  ports, — and 
the  majority  of  damage  to  the  French  personel  (twenty-seven 
men)  occurred  in  the  three  floating-batteries." 

The  affair  proves  nothing,  unless  it  be  that  "  dilapidated  "  and 
ill-designed  and  ill-constructed  works,  armed  w^ith  inferior  cali- 
bres, cannot  contend  against  such  an  overwhelming  array  of 
force  as  was  here  displayed.  But  the  failure  to  derive  from  it 
any  conclusion  against  "  masonry-casemated"  works,  or  "castles," 
is  the  more  signal,  owing  to  the  very  important  fact  that  it  was 


30:  [Assembly 

mainly  a  contest  of  "open"  or  "barbette"  batteries,  whose 
superiority  over  casemated  ones  has  been  so  much  insisted  on. 

In  this  account  we  hear  nothing  of  "  practicable  breaches," 
though  doubtless  thirty- six  50-pounders,  at  500  yards,  would 
"tell"  on  the  walls  of  such  a  fort.  Yet,  as  the  "vertical  fire 
was  so  good  that  the  French  admiral  attributed  to  it,  in  good 
part,  the  speedy  surrender  of  the  place,"  while  the  "ricochet 
practice,"  from  the  gun-boats,  was  "severe"  upon  these  open 
batteries — while  the  "  edifices  "  behind  them  ( old  wooden  build- 
ings, "  slightly  constructed  and  plastered  over")  were  in  a  blaze, 
which  must  have  made,  by  heat  and  smoke,  the  service  of  the 
guns  almost  impracticable — there  is  no  difiiculty  in  accounting 
for  the  result  of  the  contest. 

Whether  or  not  a  "practicable  breach"  was  made,  is  of  little 
consequence,  in  such  a  case  ;  but,  turned  upside  down  as  (accord- 
ing to  Grivel)  the  defences  were,  with  the  garrison  nearly  buried 
in  the  "ruins,"  it  appears  there  were  only  157  (out  of  1,400) 
killed  and  wounded — a  very  small  loss,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances. 

The  fact  is,  that  these  "open  batteries  "  were  "turned  upside 
down" — the  guns  disabled  and  dismounted,  by  the  deluge  of 
direct,  vertical  and  ricochet  fire  poured  upon  them — as  in  all 
"open  batteries,"  in  such  situations,  ever  will  happen* 

I  have  given  much  space  to  this  affair  of  Kinburn,  for  Grivel 
parades  it  as  a  fair  illustration  of  what  "  floating  batteries,  com- 
bined with  bomb-vessels,  gun-boats,  &c.,"  can  do  against  "  ma- 
sonry-casemated "  works.  I  have  shown  how*  inaccurate  (by 
comparison  with  the  official  accounts)  is  Grivel's  version  of  the 
ajffair ;  and  I  have  further  shown,  that  no  conclusion  whatever  can 
be  drawn  from  this  contest  of  insignificant  works,  armed  with  low 
calibres,  against  such  overwhelming  means  of  attack  as  were  here 
arrayed ;  unless,  indeed,  it  be  this  (a  fact  before  well  known), 
that  for  low  sites,  open  batteries  are  the  most  inefficient  of  all.  The 

*  According  to  the  "Pictorial  History,"  the  Russian  artillerymen  at  these  **open  bat- 
teries" were  exposed  besides  to  the  fire  of  sharpshooters.  It  says  "  Bazaine,"  (the  Gen- 
eral commanding  the  French  troops)  "  placed  two  companies  of  chasseurs  under  cover, 
at  a  distance  of  400  yards  from  the  east  side  of  the  fort,  and  kept  up  a  fusilade  on  the 
Russian  artillerymen." 

As  to  the  armament,  the  same  author  says, — "The  captors  found  nearly  80  guns 
mounted  in  the  fort  and  batteries,  mostly  long  and  heavy  18  and  24  pounders;  but  there 
were  many  others  ready  for  mounting,  platforms  to  support  them,  and  newly  constructed 
casemates,  raising  the  total  of  guns  to  174." 

Notwithstanding  that  the  fort  was  (according  to  Grivel)  capsized"  (chavire)  and  the 
garrison  nearly  buried  in  the  "ruins,"  it  does  not  appear  that  they  were  fully  sensible  of 
their  condition.  The  "  Pictorial  History"  says, — "The  officers  in  general  bore  the  scene"  \ 
(the  surrender)  "with  dignity,  but  with  deep  mortification;  and  many  of  them  were  said 
to  be  on  the  verge  of  mutiny  against  the  governor,  so  strongly  did  they  resist  any  proposals 
for  a  surrender." 


No.  58.] 


31 


fort  of  Kinburn  surrendered,  not  because  it  was  breached,  not 
because  its  defenders  were  so  far  diminished  by  their  losses  as  to 
be  unable  to  protract  the  contest,  but  simply  because  the  guns 
and  gunners,  exposed  in  all  possible  ways,  were  put  hors-de-com- 
bat,  and  the  calibres  were  incapable  of  doing  any  great  damage 
to  the  vessels,  at  the  distance  they  were  stationed. 

With  regard  to  the  effect  and  endurance  of  the  much-vaunted 
Jlcaing-batteries,  Commander  Dahlgren  very  judiciously  remarks  : 

*'  The  use  that  can  be  made  of  floating-batteries,  as  auxiliaries 
in  attacking  shore-works,  must  depend  on  further  confirmation 
of  their  asserted  invulnerability.  It  may  be  that  the  perform- 
ance at  Kinburn  answered  the  expectation  of  the  French  empe- 
ror as  regards  offensive  power,  for  that  is  a  mere  question  of  the 
battering  capacity  of  the  heaviest  calibres,  which  is  undoubted ; 
but  the  main  issue,  which  concerns  their  endurance,  cannot  be 
settled  by  the  impact  of  32-pounder  shot,  fired  at  600  and  7 00  yards. 
Far  heavier  projectiles  will  in  future  be  found  on  all  sea-board 
fortifications  ;  and  the  ingenuity  of  the  artillerist  may  also  be 
exerted  more  successfully  than  at  Kinburn.  Still,  it  is  not  to  be 
doubted  that  the  floating-battery  is  a  formidable  element  in 
assailing  forts,  even  if  its  endurance  falls  short  of  absolute  invul- 
nerability ;  and  the  defence  will  do  well  to  provide  against  its 
employment." 

Experiments  in  England  have  shown,  that  such  vessels,  pro- 
tected by  wrought 'iron  plates  4  J  inches  thick,  were  incapable  of 
resisting  a  solid  68-pounder  shot  at  400  yards.*  Such  shot,  and  even 
greater,  they  will  certainly  have  to  resist,  if  they  are  to  contend 
with  the  modern  armament  of  our  fortifications.  Grivel  sagely 
cautions  them  to  take  position  at  such  a  distance  that  they  cannot 
be  penetrated.  The  only  possibility,  however,  of  breaching  a 
well-constructed  masonry  revetment  consists  in  placing  the  bat- 
tery at  very  short  distance.  The  difficulty  of  breaching  increases 
enormously,  even  in  land  batteries,  with  increase  of  distance  ;  far 
more  in  floating-batteries,  owing  to  the  unavoidable  motion  of  the 
vessel,  which,  at  considerable  distances,  scatters  the  projectiles 
far  and  wide.f 

*  *'The  target  was  an  immense  construction  of  timber  and  iron,  combined  exactly,  like 
tbe  sides  of  the  batteries  ;  iron  4  in.  thick.  Twenty-four  rounds  of  GS-poundres  were  fired, 
the  first  14  of  which,  at  600  yards  ;  and  after  the  first  few  rounds,  the  timber  gave  way  in* 
all  directions.  The  last  10  rounds,  at  400,  and  the  work  of  destruction  was  complete.  The 
last  shot  fired  went  completely  through  the  target,  timber  and  iron  included."  (CiTil  Engi- 
neer and  Architect's  Journal,  Jan.  1858. 

t  The  idea  that  a,  floating  structure  can  be  made  shot-proof,  whilo  the  walls  of  a  fort  can- 
not be,  is  so  transparently  absurd  as  scarcely  to  require  refutation.  All  that  will  be  main- 
tained, probably,  will  be,  that  in  general  the  latter  are  not  shot  proof.  I  shall  allude  to 
this  subject  again. 


32 


[Assemble? 


The  works  at  Bomarsund  were  taken  by  means  of  land  bat- 
terieSf  which  breached  the  exposed  walls  of  the  towers  and  main 
work. 

There  is  no  more  stringent  rule  of  fortification  than  that 
which  demands  that  all  masonry  shall  be  covered  (by  earth  works 
or  otherwise)  from  the  action  of  land  batteries,  where  the  circum- 
stances of  the  location  render  their  use  practicable.  The  Russians 
disregarded  this  rule  in  the  arrangement  of  their  works  at  Bomar- 
sund, and  to  that  disregard  owed  the  prompt  reduction  of  the 
place.  The  masonry  was  faced  with  large  blocks  of  granite,  of 
very  irregular  shape,  backed  by  rubble.  I  doubt  very  much 
whether  Lieutenant  Morton's  assertion  is  tenable,  that  it  is  cer- 
tain that  the  scarp  of  our  sea-coast  works  are  no  stronger^than 
those  of  Bomarsund. 

Concerning  the  action  of  the  land  batteries,  Sir  Howard 
Douglas  says  :  "  Authentic  information,  for  the  accuracy  of  which 
the  author  vouches,  enables  him  to  state  that,  with  respect  to 
the  effect  of  solid  shot  on  the  granite,  with  which  the  walls  were 
faced,  the  French  guns  made  no  impression  on  the  blocks  when 
they  struck  perpendicularly  in  the  middle  of  their  faces ;  nor 
did  the  shot  fired  from  the  powerful  32-pounder  British  guns 
split  the  granite  when  so  struck ;  but,  when  the  blocks  were  hit 
by  the  latter  near  the  edge,  or  on  a  joint  of  the  masonry,  they 
were  displaced,  the  joints  penetrated,  the  wall  shaken  ;  and  this 
not  being  backed  with  solid  masonry,  but  filled  in  with  rubble, 
the  mass  was  thrown  down,  and  a  practicable  breach  formed. 
This  successful  operation  is  very  generally,  but  erroneously, 
stated  to  have  been  effected  by  the  fire  of  the  ships,  and  is  even 
strongly  held  up  as  a  proof  of  what  ships  can  do,  and  ought  to 
attempt  elsewhere." 

The  large  joints  which  the  rubble  facing  Of  Bomarsund  offered, 
facilitated  greatly  the  action  of  batteries.  Such  joints  are  not 
found  in  our  scarps,  exposed  to  vessels'  fire  ;  nor,  in  general,  are 
such  walls  (where  casemated  and  pierced  for  guns)  "  backed  with 
concrete." 

But  the  experimental  practice  of  the  "  Edinburgh,"  upon  the 
walls  of  Bomarsund  (after  the  capture),  deserves  to  be  recorded  ; 
for  here,  if  ever,  with  all  the  means,  and  no  hostile  shot  to  en- 
counter, a  ship's  batteries  might  be  expected  to  breach  "  granite 


*  See  Appendix  "A." 


No.  58.] 


33 


walls."  The  "  Edinburgh  "  had,  in  this  case,  all  the  essential  qua- 
lities of  a  floating  battery,  viz. :  the  largest  and  most  powerful 
guns  in  the  British  navy :  shot-proof  sides  would  not  have  added 
to  her  offensive  powers. 

I  give  Sir  Howard  Douglas^  own  words: — ''But  the  results  of 
the  experimental  firing  at  the  remnant  of  the  fort,  which,  unless 
the  previous  firing  of  the  ships  during  the  attack  was  absolutely 
harmless,  must  have  been  somewhat  damaged,  and  moreover 
shaken  by  the  blowing-up  of  the  contiguous  portions,  do  not  war- 
rant this  conclusion,  even  should  the  attacking  ships  be  per- 
mitted, like  the  'Edinburgh,'  to  take  up,  quietly  and  coolly,  posi- 
tions within  500  yards,  and  then  deliberately  commence  and 
continue  their  firing,  without  being  fired  at!  The  firing  of  the 
'  Edinburgh,'  at  1,060  yards,  was  unsatisfactory.  390  shot  and 
shells  were  fired,  from  the  largest  and  most  powerful  guns  in  the 
British  navy  (viz.  :  from  the  Lancaster  gun  of  95  cwt.,  with  an 
elongated  shell  of  100  lbs;  from  68-pounders  of  95  cwt.,  and 
32-pounders  of  56  cwt.,  solid  shot  guns ;  from  10-inch  shell  guns 
of  84  cwt.,  with  hollow  shot  of  84  lbs. ;  from  8-inch  shell  guns 
of  65  and  60  cwt.,  with  hollow  shot  of  56  lbs.),  did  but  little 
injury  to  the  w^ork.  At  480  yards,  250  shot,  shell,  and  hollow 
shot  were  fired.  A  small  breach  was  formed  in  the  facing  of  the 
outer  wall,  of  extremely  bad  masonry,  and  considerable  damage 
done  to  the  ^mbrasures  and  other  portions  of  the  wall ;  but  no 
decisive  result  was  obtained,  no  practicable  breach  formed,  by 
which  the  work  might  be  assaulted,  taken,  and  effectually  des- 
troyed, although  640  shot  and  shells  (40,000  lbs.  of  metal)  were 
fired  into  the  place,  first  at  1,060,  and  then  at  480  yards." 

Truly,  if  floating  batteries  can  do  no  better  than  this  when 
they  have  it  "  all  their  own  way,"  I  think  we  need  not  be  in  very 
great  apprehension  for  (even)  our  "  isolated  forts,"  which  Grivel 
seems  to  think  (and  Lieutenant  Morton  quotes  his  opinion) 
"cannot  long  resist  an  attack  properly  conducted,  however  solidly 
constructed  they  may  6e."    (The  italics  are  mine.) 

The  harbor  defences  of  Sabastapol  were  very  fair  specimens 
of  Russian  "  masonry-casemated  "  works,  and  are  types  of  the 
same  class  of  works  built  in  this  country ;  though  the  material 
of  which  they  were  built  w^as  very  inferior,  and  they  we're  in 
many  ve7'y  important  details  (as  I  shall  show  hereafter),  particu- 
larly embrasures,  vastly  inferior  to  our  oldest  specimens,  and  not 

[Assem.  No.  58.]  5 


34 


[Assembly 


to  be  compared  at  all  with  those  built  by  us  in  the  last  few  years. 
The  ''Naval  Cannonade"  of  these  works  on  the  l7th  of  October, 
1854,  might  be  expected  to  throw  some  light  upon  the  relative 
powers  and  liabilities  to  injury  of  the  two  characters  of  arma- 
ments here  opposed.  But  such  is  not  the  case.  The  Russian 
works  were  not  armed  with  the  powerful  seacoast  guns  now 
deemed  essential ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  allied  fleet  was 
nothing  hut  a  fleet — i.  e.,  it  was  not  provided  with  those  special 
means  of  attack  (gun-boats,  mortar-vessels,  floating-batteries,  &c.) 
which  will  always  hereafter  he  provided  for  such  attacks.  It  was, 
therefore,  an  old-fashioned  affair^  and  might  rather  be  set  down 
as  the  last  attempt  to  array  ships  of-the-line  and  ordinary  vessels-of- 
war  against  fortifications.  This  question  has  long  been  practically 
(though  not  confessedly,  perhaps)  settled.  It  was  settled  before 
our  Mexican  war,  when  for  near  a  whole  year  our  fleets  threaten- 
ed San  Juan  de  UUoa,  yet  never  ventured  to  measure  their 
strength  with  it,  notwithstanding  they  had  the  precedent  of  the 
quite  recent,  much-vaunted  French  triumph  over  this  very  work*. 
It  was  practically  settled  throughout  this  whole  European  war^ 
in  which  the  powerful  allied  fleets  (the  most  powerful  naval 
armaments  the  world  had  ever  seen)  threatened,  in  turn,  all  the 
strongholds  of  Russia  on  the  Baltic ;  and,  notwithstanding^  that 
public  opinion  at  home,  and  naval  pride  in  the  fleet,  demanded 
some  exploit  which  should  be  commensurate  with  the  immense 
preparations  made,  retired  abashed,  and  confounded,  before  the 

masonry-casemated  castles,'^  whose  "  crockery  "  walls  did  not, 
after  all,  seem  to  invite  a  close  contact,  or  "  hard  knocks and 
which  so  proudly  fulfilled  their  mission  in  protecting,  throughout 
that  war,  the  military  and  naval  depots,  the  wealth,  the  com- 
merce, and  the  national  honor  of  Russia. 

Sweaborg,  indeed,  sufiered ;  but  it  was  from  a  distant  bom- 
bardment, which  left  her  fortifications  and  her  harbors  intact, 
and  only  showed  the  necessity  of  protecting  at  greater  distance, 
all  great  depots^  or  great  cities. 

Bomarsund- — alas  for  Bomarsund!  or  rather  for  the  prestige 
of  the  mighty  naval  armament  which  would  have  assaulted  it. 
07ie  single  "  masonry-casemated  castle  bid  defiance  to  this: 
proud  armament,  whose  chiefs,  concluding  wisely  that  "  discre- 

♦  It  is  worthy  of  remark  in  this  place,  that  this  **casemated  castle  "  (like  very  many 
of  the  Russian  batteries  of  the  same  character)  had  nothing  but  casemate  guns.  There  was 
not  (as  is  invariably  the  case  with  our  own  works)  an  open  battery  "  (barbette)  on  the 
top  ;  the  upper  tier  of  arches  being  simply  made  bomb-proof  by  earth,  and  roofed  over. 


No.  58.] 


35 


tion  was  the  better  part  of  valor,"  sent  home  for  10,000  French 
troops,  who,  with  a  few  16  and  32-pounder  guns  in  land-batteries, 
speedily  reduced  the  work. 

The  Naval  Cannonade  "  at  Sebastopol  was  a  mere  '^simulacre^^ 
of  an  operation,  of  which  the  inutility  was  felt,  and  from  which 
no  other  results  were  expected  than  a  diversion  of  the  attention 
and  strength  of  the  garrison  from  the  land  side,  where  a  real 
struggle  for  predominance  was  going  on  between  the  artillery 
fires  of  beseiged  and  besiegers. 

The  allied  fleet  consisted  of  14  French,  10  British  and  2  Turk- 
ish ships-of-the-line  (some  few  of  which  had  auxiliary  steam 
power),  and  a  number  of  side- wheel  steamers  to  tow  these  ;  and 
carried  in  all  about  2,500  guns.  It  was  opposed  by  about  280 
guns  from  the  works.  The  fleet  kept  itself  (in  general)  at  a 
respectable  distance  (from  1,500  to  2,000  yards) ;  too  far  to  inflict 
any  material  injury  with  its  armament  (32-pounders,  with  a 
moderate  proportion  of  8-inch  shell  guns)  upon  the  works ; — too 
far  to  receive  much  from  the  inefficient  armament  of  the  Russian 
works. 

The  only  exception  to  this  remark  applies  to  the  detached 
English  squadron  under  Sir  Edmund  Lyons,  consisting  of  the 
"Agamemnon,"  Sanspareil,"  London,"  *'Arethusa,"  and  *'A1- 
bion,"  the  first  named  of  which  vessels  took  a  position  at  750  or 
800  yards  from  Fort  Constantino,  while  the  others  stretched 
along,  at  abfcut  the  same  distance  from  Fort  Constantino,  the 
Wasp  Tower  "  and  "  Telegraph  Battery."  Dahlgren  describes 
the  result  as  follows : 

"  The  Agamemnon  was  very  seriously  maltreated,  though  not 
to  such  an  extent  as  to  impair  her  power  of  battery  or  engine. 
She  was  on  fire  several  times ;  was  struck  by  240  shot  or  shells ; 
and,  singular  to  say,  only  lost  29,  while  her  second,  just  by,  lost 
10  men.  The  Albion  sufi'ered  still  more,  and  in  an  hour  was 
towed  out,  crippled,  and  on  fire  in  more  than  one  place,  with  a 
loss  of  81  men.  The  crews  of  the  London  and  Arethusa  fared 
rather  better,  but  the  ships  nearly  as  ill ;  and  they,  too,  remained 
in  station  but  a  little  time  after  the  Albion.  The  Queen  was 
driven  off  soon  after  she  got  into  her  new  position,  in  great 
danger;  and  the  Rodney  had  the  bare  satisfaction  of  getting 
aground  and  afloat  after  experiencing  some  damage." 

"  The  valtle  of  the  small  works  on  the  cape  and  blufi's  was 
clearly  defined  in  these  results ;  being  above  the  dense  cloud  of 


36 


[Assembly 


smoke  that  enveloped  the  ships  and  the  lower  fo;  Ls,  their  aim 
was  not  embarrassed,  while  the  seamen  labored  under  the  diffi- 
culty of  firing,  with  an  inconvenient  elevation,  at  objects  that 
they  saw  but  seldom,  and  then  but  dimly  and  briefly.  As  a 
consequence,  three  line-of-battle  ships  and  a  frigate  were  driven 
off  very  shortly  and  in  great  peril,  and  a  fourth  badly  cut  up ; 
while  the  Agamemnon  lay  opposed  to  one  of  the  heaviest  sea- 
forts  with  two  tiers  of  casemates,  and  at  the  end  of  five  hours 
came  off  with  comparatively  little  loss.'' 

Whatever  superiority  of  effect  the  batteries  on  the  heights 
may  have  had  (and  we  have  so  few  details  about  these  works 
that  we  can  draw^  no  sure  conclusion  from  this  mere  naked  state- 
ment of  damages  received  by  the  vessels,  it  evidently  was  not 
for  want  of  being  hit  often  enough  (smoke  or  no  smoke),  that 
the  "Agamemnon"  escaped  with  so  little  injury.  She  "was 
struck  by  240  shot  and  shells;"  and  it  is  only  due  to  the  ineffi- 
ciency of  the  projectiles  by  which  she  was  struck,  that  she  was 
not  destroyed. 

With  respect  to  the  damages  received  by  Fort  Constantine,  I 
quote  again  from  Dahlgren,  at  length  : 

"  The  distance  of  the  Agamemnon  and  Sanspareil  from  Fort 
Constantine  (l7th  October,  1854)  was  assumed  to  be  about  800 
yards ;  Lord  Raglan  states  it  to  have  been  rather  less.  These 
two  ships  could  bring  to  bear  about  8l  guns,  and  the  firing  from 
them  probably  lasted  some  four  hours.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  it  inflicted  much  damage,  for  the  Russian  commander-iur 
chief  admits  it  in  his  official  report ;  but  not  sufficient  to  impair 
the  strength  of  the  masonry,  and  far  short  of  effecting  a  breach 
in  it." 

"At  Bomarsund,  the  results  were  rather  different: — Three 
32.pounders  of  42  cwt.  (guns  of  inferior  weight),  were  landed  from 
a  ship's  spar  deck,  and  placed  in  battery  at  950  yards  from  the 
North  Tower — the  masonry  of  good  quality  and  6  J  feet  thick. 
Ill  eight  hours,  the  wall  between  two  embrasures  was  cut 
through  from  top  to  bottom,  offering  a  practicable  breach,  to 
effect  which  48t  shot  and  45  shells  were  fired,*  being  at  the  rate 
of  one  round  from  the  battery  in  rather  less  than  a  minute ;  or, 
from  each  gun,  one  in  2|-  minutes.    The  Tower  surrendered." 

"It  seems  almost  incredible  that  three  pieces  should  be  able 
to  accomplish  fully  that  which  eighty-seven  pieces  tftterly  failed 

*  Report  of  General  Neil,  Commanding  Engineers. 


No.  58.]  Si 

to  do,  the  distances  from  the  object  being  alike — particularly 
when  it  is  considered  that  many  of  the  latter  were  of  greater 
calibre,  and  most  of  them  employed  much  heavier  charges  where 
the  calibres  were  similar.  The  guns  of  the  ship,  if  fired  at  the 
same  rate  as  those  of  the  battery,  which  was  not  unusually  rapid, 
(one  round  in  two  and  three-fourth  minutes),  would  have  dis- 
charged some  seven  thousand  seven  hunered  shot  and  shells  in 
the  course  of  the  four-hours,  supposing  no  interruption  :  a  num- 
ber of  which,  if  properly  applied,  would  appear,  from  the  results 
of  three  guns,  to  have  been  sufficient  to  breach  the  wall  of  the 
fort  in  fourteen  places ;  whereas  they  did  not  effect  a  single 
breach,  which  is  abundant  proof  of  the  lack  of  accuracy.  They 
must  either  have  been  dispersed  over  the  surface  of  the  fort,  or 
else  missed  it  altogether,  and  this  could  have  been  due  only  to  a 
want  of  the  precision  which  was  attained  by  the  battery.  The 
constantly  preferred  complaint  of  motion  in  the  ships  A^as  not  to 
be  urged,  because  on  the  day  of  cannonading  Sebastopol  there 
was  scarcely  a  breath  of  wind,  and  the  ships  were  too  large  to 
be  easily  moved  by  the  swell,  unless  very  considerable.  That 
the  fort  did  no  greater  damage  to  the  ships  than  it  received  from 
them,  proves  no  more  than  that  its  fire  was  quite  as  illy  directed, 
and  the  calibres  too  low.  It  is  said  that  the  Agamemnon  was 
struck  in  the  hull  by  two  hundred  and  forty  shot  and  shells, 
which  must  have  been  but  a  small  portion  of  what  was  fired, 
though  suflBcient  to  be  decisive,  if,  as  already  observed,  the 
calibre  had  been  heavier." 

A  number  of  projectiles  sufficient  to  produce  fourteen  "prac- 
ticable breaches  "  if  thrown  by  a  land  battery,  here  failed,  not 
only  to  produce  a  single  breach,  but  even  "to  impair  the  strength 
of  the  masonry." 

Commander  Dahlgren,  indeed,  deprecates  the  "  want  of  pre- 
cision but  that  degree  of  precision  by  which  a  breach  is  efi'ected 
by  a  land  battery,  is  utterly  unattainable  from  a  floating  struc- 
ture, and  the  perfect  calm  which  prevailed  on  this  occasion  can- 
not be  counted  on,  in  general,  and  even  the  swell  in  tbe  calmest 
days  is  quite  sufficient  to  disperse  the  projectiles  from  a  floating 
battery,  at  four  hundred  and  five  hundred  yards,  far  and  wide.* 

♦Commander  Dahlgren  commends  the  "Nelsonian  vigor"  of  this  spirited  and  bril- 
liant episode  enacted  by  the  detached  squadron."  With  all  deferences  to  so  competent  a 
judge,  I  cannot  help  remarking  that  if  there  was  "Nelsonian  vigor,"  there  was  no  ''Nel- 
sonian" result.  The  trifling  damage  done  to  the  fort  was  a  poor  compensation  for  the  loss 
of  over  two  hundred  men,  and  the  serious  injuries  all  the  vessels  of  this  detached  squad- 
ron received. 


[Assembly 


I  hav^  said  that,  as  to  the  contest  of  ordinary  navil  means,  or 
fleets  with  fortifications,  the  question  has,  long  since,  been  prac- 
tically settled. 

The  following  extract  from  Grivel  will  show  how  the  matter  is 
regarded  even  by  those  who  believe  that  fortifications  7nay  be 
successfully  attacked  by  naval  means  specially  adapted  to  the 
objects. 

"  If  the  coast  defences  are  at  the  same  level,  or  can  be  com- 
manded by  the  floating  artillery ;  if  the  depth  of  water  permits 
to  combat  them  separately  and  to  approach  at  half-point-blank 
distance,  (that  is  300  or  400  metres.)  we  would  still  say  to  the 
ships,  however  well  armed  we  suppose  them :  Never  attack  with- 
out an  imperious  and  absolute  necessity." 

But  if  these  works  occupy  positions  which  command  the  sea 
while  they  reciprocally  sustain  each  other  ;  if  sub-marine  obsta- 
cles, or  other  causes,  oblige  the  floating  artillery  to  maintain  a 
greater  distance,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  say  to  ships : 

"Keep  off,  the  match  is  too  unequal,  but  bring  up  your  siege 
floating-batteries." 

"  For  then  will  be  the  time  to  substitute  these  formidable  ma- 
chines of  war,  and  their  artillery  of  great  penetration,  for  the 
vulnerable  sides  and  guns  of  less  .range  of  ordinary  vessels." 
Even  in  the  most  favorable  case  he  can  describe,  he  says  to 
ships :  "  Attack  not  without  an  imperious  and  absolute  necessity." 

The  question  of  direct  contest  for  superiority  between  forts 
and  naval  armaments  will  be  narrowed  down  to  this  :  If  forts 
are  to  protect  the  channel  (as  they  usually  are)  through  which  a 
fleet  must  pass  to  reach  our  ports  or  cities,  or  naval  and  military 
depots,  the  fleet  will  either  run  by,  or,  if  the  works  are  too  for- 
midable, decline  contest  altogether  :  but,  if  the  object  of  attack  is 
sufficient  to  justify  the  preparation — {the  great  port  and  city  of  J\*ew 
York  for  instance)  and  the  defences  are  such  as  to  invite  the  ef- 
fort, the  maritime  enemy  will  provide  these  "  formidable  machines 
of  war,"  and  enter  into  a  direct  contest  with  them,  with  a  view  to 
their  reduction. 

I  am  now  considering  the  latter  branch  of  this  subject,  and 
think  that  I  have  made  it  clear  that  so  far  as  we  have  yet  any 
experience,  there  is  nothing  to  justify  the  apprehension  that  the 
masonry  scarps  of  casemated  batteries  can  be  destroyed  by  the 
cannonade  of  floating-batteries.  Of  course,  if  such  vessels  are 
permitted,  unopposed  by  the  guns  of  the  battery  itself,  to  take 


No.  58.] 


39 


their  own  time,  and  to  expend  unlimited  quantities  of  projectiles, 
they  doubtless  can  batter  down  any  wall.  So  far  as  yet  tested  by 
experience,  their  bulwarks  are  not  proof  against  eight-inch  and 
ten-inch  solid  shot  at  400  yards.  If  proof  against  such  projectiles 
at  800  or  1,000  yards,*  it  is  a  well-known  fact  in  breaching,  that 
the  number  of  projectiles  necessary,  even  from  a  land  battery,  in- 
creases enormously  with  increase  of  distance.  How  much  more 
from  a  floating  structure^  which  cannot  maintain  any  such  concen- 
tration of  fire,  at  such  a  distance,  as  is  necessary  to  cause  serious 
injury  to  well-constructed  walls !  Those,  however,  who  believe 
in  such  operations,  will  probably  contend  that  nothing  analogous 
to  producing  a  "  breach"  is  necessary,  but  that  embrasures  will 
be  destroyed,  and  guns  dismounted,  and  gunners  disabled  by  em- 
brasure shots  and  splinters  from  the  masonry  cheeks,  or  by  frag- 
ments of  broken  projectiles. 

This  subject  has  not  been  overlooked  by  the  corps  whose  duty 
it  is  to  make  such  constructions.  A  series  of  experiments  was 
commenced  five  years  ago  at  West  Point  by  General  Totten, 
Chief  Engineer,  and  taken  up  again  in  1855,  for  this  very  purpose 
of  determining  the  best  kind  of  embrasure,  and  the  necessary 
thickness  of  the  scarp,  to  resist  these  modern  projectiles.  The 
results  have  been  published  f  and  are  open  to  the  examination  of 
every  one.  They  may  be  briefly  summed  up  in  the  following 
quotations : 

'*  A  thic^iness  there  of  five  feet  has  been  assumed  in  our  con- 
structions, and  satisfies  all  these  conditions  well."  (Alluding  to 
the  interior  arrangement  of  the  casemate  with  reference  to  the 
handling  of  the  gun,  &c.,  &c.)  "But  it  has  been  a  question  of 
interest,  increasing  with  the  growing  calibre  of  naval  armaments, 
whether  this  thickness  is  now  sufiicient.  And  it  was  in  conse- 
quence thereof  that  some  very  severe  firing  was  directed  against 
our  second  target.  The  gun  was  a  ten-inch  Columbiad,  placed 
within  114  yards,  firing  solid  balls,  weighing  128  pounds,  with  a 
charge  of  18  pounds  of  powder. 

"  The  general  conclusion  from  these  trials  is,  that  whether  of 

*  I  think  it  somewhat  discreditable  to  the  inventive  resources  of  those  whose  duty  it  is  to 
construct  and  perfect  artillery,  that  this  question  of  a  v«:hot-proof  vessel  should  be  an  open 
one.  The  quantity  (and  therefore  the  thickness)  of  the  iron  sheathing  is  limited  for  the 
floating-battery.  I  know  no  necessary  limit  to  the  calibre  or  weight  of  the  projectile  used 
against  it,  or  why  we  should  now  stop  at  ten-inches,  when  the  navy  has  already  successful- 
ly introduced  an  eleven-inch  gun  capable  of  throwing  a  solid  shot.  The  eleven-inch  shot 
weighs  g  more  than  the  ten-inch.  I  shall  allude  to  this  subject  of  large  calibres  for  sea- 
coast  batteries  in  another  placb.    See  Appendix  "D." 

t  Casemate  Embrasures,  Totten,"  being  No.  6  of  Papers  of  Practical  Engineering," 
published  by  the  Engineer  Department. 


40 


[Assembly 


cement  concrete,  of  bricks,  or  of  hard  stones,  the  pjrtion  of  the 
wall  at  and  around  each  embrasure,  having  the  thickness  of  five 
feet  only,  should  be  no  larger  than  is  indispensable  for  the 
adaptation  of  the  gun  and  carriage  to  the  embrasure  ;  if  restricted 
to  a  small  area  this  thickness  will  suffice — not  otherwise. 

"  The  thickness  of  five  feet  will  resist  a  number  of  these  balls, 
impinging  in  succession  on  that  space,  provided  the  bond  expand 
promptly,  above,  below,  and  on  each  side,  into  a  thickness  great- 
er by  some  2 J  feet,  or  3  feet,  or  m.ore.  Were  the  wall  no  thick- 
er generally  than  five  feet,  being  reinforced  only  by  piers  some  15 
feet  apart,  it  would  soon  be  seriously  damaged  by  battering  at 
short  distances  with  such  calibres. 

"  To  repeat  :  the  scarp  at  the  embrasure  may  be  safely  made 
of  the  thickness  of  five  feet,  provided  the  thickness  immediately 
above,  below,  and  on  the  sides,  be  increased  considerably.  The 
space  required  to  be  of  about  this  thickness  to  accommodate  ad- 
vantageously the  gun  and  carriage,  is  so  small  that  it  may  be 
said  to  be  part  of  the  thicker  surrounding  mass  by  which  it 
really  is  supported  in  its  resistance." 

And  with  regard  to  the  embrasure,  it  is  stated  : 

"  Our  experiments  show  that  wrought-iron  is  the  best  material 
for  insertion  as  above  mentioned  ;  and  that  a  thickness  of 
wrought  iron  of  eight-inches,  solidly  backed  with  masonry,  will 
resist  an  eight-inch  solid  ball  fired  with  10|  pounds  of  powder 
from  a  distance  of  200  yards.  It  is  necessary,  as  is  also  shown 
by  the  firings,  that  the  plates  of  iron  should  have  considerable 
breadth  to  prevent  heavy  balls  from  forcing  themselves  in  be- 
tween the  inner  edge  and  the  masonry,  thereby  crowding  the 
plate  edgewise  into  the  throat." 

From  these  results  an  embrasure  has  been  devised  by  the  Chief 
Engineer,  and  sanctioned  by  the  War  Department,  having 
wrought-iron  throat-plates  8  inches  thick  (capable  of  resisting 
the  impact  of  an  8-inch  solid  shot  from  200  yards  distance),  and 
the  whole  surrounding  structure  of  granite-blocks,  of  large  di- 
mensions, bonded  together,  and  into  the  adjacent  thick  parts  of 
the  wall,  in  the  strongest  manner  that  such  a  structure  can  be 
made.  Those  who  deny  the  capability  of  such  a  construction  to 
resist  sufficiently  the  projectiles  of  an  hostile  armament,  should, 
at  least,  'prove  that  their  incredulity  is  justifiable,  by  experiments 
as  elaborate  as  those  I  have  referred  to. 

But  the  discussion  is  cut  short  at  once  by  the  following  para- 
graph from  the  report : 


No.  58.] 


41 


Were  it  not  for  the  vastly  greater  cost,  the  whole  scarp 
might  be  faced  with  iron — indeed  might  be  made  of  iron  only  ; 
but,  until  there  shall  be  much  stronger  reasons  than  now  exist, 
or  are  now  anticipated,  for  believing  that  well-constructed  ma- 
sonry batteries  may  be  breached  by  naval  broadsides,  the  cheap- 
er construction  may  be  safely  followed — especially  as,  should 
such  a  necessity  ever  arise,  they  may  be  externally  plated  with 
iron." 

If  the  necessity  arises — if  there  shall  hereafter  be  "  stronger 
reasons  than  now  exist,  or  are  now  anticipated,''  for  giving  still 
greater  strength  to  the  surrounding  wall — the  alternative  is  open 
to  us,  as  to  those  who  construct  the  floating-battery,  {without  the 
objection  of  weight,  so  very  difficult  to  overcome  in  that  struc- 
ture), to  coat  it  (about  the  embrasures,  or  further,  if  necessary) 
with  iron  plates. 

Those  who  are  curious  on  the  subject  of  "  Embrasures,"  and  of 
the  risks  to  which  the  gunners  behind  them  are  exposed,  would 
do  well  to  examine  the  work  referred  to. 

They  will  find,  among  other  things,  that  while  some  of  the 
modem  European  works  present  an  exterior  ope.  ing  of  54  square 
feet  (in  which  area,  owing  to  the  flaring  cheeks,  nearly  all  the 
small  projectiles  are  reflected  through  the  throat,  while  large 
ones  are  broken  and  their  fragments  hurled  within),  no  embrasure 
has  been  constructed  in  the  United  States  since  1815  having  an 
exterior  oj>3ning  exceeding  10  or  11  square  feet;  and  that  the 
model  embrasure  of  1855  practically  reduces  the  opening  to  that 
of  the  throat,  which  is  hut  square  feet — an  object  not  much 
larger  than  the  muzzle  of  a  large  gun.  The  security  of  the  gun- 
ners behind  this  embrasure  is  as  great,  probably,  as  it  is  practi- 
cable to  give  anywhere;"^  it  is  probably  greater  than  in  an  open 
barbette  battery. 

The  question  of  the  capacity — actual  and  possible — of  ma- 
sonry-casemated  castles"  to  resist  the  fire  of  a  hostile  armament, 
need  not  be  pursued  further.  When  we  bear  in  mind  that  the 
hostile  "  floating  batteries,"  of  whatever  description,  will  them- 
selves be  exposed  to  the  most  formidable  projectiles  that  can  be 

*  A  simple  expedient,  advocated  by  one  of  our  officers,  and  partially  practiced  in  Eu- 
rope, to  raise  the  embrasure  so  that  all  embrasure  shot  would  pass  over  the  heads  of  the 
gunners  (as  in  the  barbette  battery),  would,  in  a  great  degree,  do  away  with  the  danger  of 
the  "  embrasure  shot"  of  all  kinds,  and  with  the  necessity  of  grape -proof  *•  shutters,"  ap- 
plied to  the  new  embrasure . 


[Assem.  No.  58.] 


6 


42 


[Assembly 


thrown  from  shore  batteries — that  when  they  choose  to  come  to 
^'  close  quarters"  to  attempt  to  breach,  their  "  embrasures''  pre- 
sent openings  (see  Paper  No.  6,  before  referred  to)  through  which 
deluges  of  grape,  canister,  and  musket  balls  can  be  poured  upon 
the  gunners;*  and  consider  what  experience  has  so  far  shown, 
and  reason  has  taught  us,  with  regard  to  the  casemate,  we  need 
not  be  under  apprehension  that  our  casemated  works  will  be  bat- 
tered down;  nor  doubt  that  they  will,  as  they  did  in  Russia, 
answer  the  important  purposes  for  which  they  were  designed. 

It  only  remains  to  show  the  necessity  of  such  works.  It,  in 
general,  costs  much  less  to  place  a  gun  behind  an  earthen  para- 
pet than  to  build  a  masonry  structure  covered  with  bomb-proof 
arches,  in  which  to  mount  it.f  All  authorities  agree  that  an  open 
barbette  battery  (GrivePs  very  forcible  admission  has  been  quo- 
ted), on  a  low  site,  and  to  which  vessels  can  approach  within  300 
or  400  yards,  is  utterly  inadmissible.  It  may  safely  be  said  that, 
in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  the  sites  which  furnish  the  efficient  raking 
and  cross  fires  upon  the  channels,  are  exactly  of  this  character  ; 
and  indeed  it  very  often  happens  that  there  are  no  other s.\ 

When  such  sites  are  found,  it  rarely  happens  that  they  aiford 
room  for  sufficient  number  of  guns  in  open  batteries. §  Hence  the 
necessity  of  putting  them  tier  above  tier,  which  involves,  of 
course,  the  casemated  structure.  Such  works  furnishing  from 
their  lower  tier  a  low,  rasing  fire,  and  (if  of  several  tiers)  a 
plunging  fire  from  their  barbettes,  ofier  as  favorable  emplace- 
ments for  guns  as  can  be  contrived,  and  afford  to  their  gunners  a 

*  Grivel  seems  to  think  that,  as  to  embrasure  shot,  the  floating  and  land  battery  are  on 
equal  terms;  but  the  embrasure  of  the  floating  structure  cannot  be  made  as  small  as  that 
of  the  casemate;  nor  can  the  expedient  of  shutters,"  or  of  raising  tae  embrasures  above 
the  heads  of  the  men,  be  resorted  to. 

t  The  discrepancy  in  cost  is  not,  however,  by  any  means,  what  this  naked  statement 
would  make  it  appear.  A  gun  behind  an  open  parapet  is  exposed  to  being  disabled  or 
spiked  by  a  mere  boat's  crew  taking  the  battery  by  surprise.  (Some  degree  of  defensive 
strength  is  necessary  in  all  cases;  and  in  .sowie cases  the  necessary  strength  involves  (inde- 
pendent of  other  causes)  the  construction  of  a  regular  fortification.  The  open  earthen  bat- 
teries of  Lieutenant  Morton  rest  on  inclosed  bastions  of  masonry,  each  of  which  is  larger 
than  most  of  our  harbor  works. 

X  Take  the  case  of  Sebastopol,  about  which  there  are  heights.  None  of  them  (Command- 
er Dahlgren's  remarks  have  already  been  quoted)  furnish  proper  sites  for  defending  the 
harbor.  Cronstadt  offered  no  other  sites  whatever  than  artificial  ones  in,  or  islands  almost 
level  with,  the  water.  Our  own  harbors  generally  ofi"er  the  same  illustration  of  the  ab- 
sence of  favorable  sites  for  open  batteries. 

§  Staten  Island,  at  the  Narrows,  furnishes  an  apt  illustration.  The  heights  here  are  of 
about  120  feet.  From  the  open  batteries  of  Fort  Tompkins,  on  the  summit,  heavy  guns 
will  rake  the  approach,  and  have  a  plunging  fire  upon  passing  vessels.  The  entire  face  of 
the  heights  (so  far  as  the  United  States  properly  extends)  is,  or  is  to  be,  girdled  with  open 
earth  batteries  at  heights  of  60  and  45  feet.  We  have  here  about  as  many  guns  as  ca'i  be 
ranged  in  such  batteries.  But  it  is  not  deemed  enough ;  nor  is  the  character  of  the  fire 
such  as  to  dispense  with  the  numerous,  and  close,  and  rasing  fires  to  be  obtained  from  the 
sites  at  the  water's  edge,  on  which  Fort  Richmond  is  already  built,  and  another  similar 

pasemated  castle"  is  to  be  built. 


No.  58.] 


43 


degree  of  security  quite  as  great  as  can  be  given  to  men  thus  en- 
gaged.* 

On  subjects  which  have  a  mere  speculative  importance,  there 
is  no  danger  in  giving  rein  to  speculation ;  but  on  those  of  such 
real  and  intense  practical  importance  as  the  s  curity  against  hos- 
tile aggression  of  the  great  city  and  port  of  NcvV  York,  it  is  not 
admissible  to  set  aside  the  experience  of  the  past,  or  the  opin- 
ions of  the  best  minds  who  have  devoted  themselves  to  such  sub- 
jects. A  means  of  defence,  sanctioned  by  its  being  confided  into 
protect  the  great  ports  of  Europe,  which  has  protected  the  great 
ports  of  Russia  against  the  most  formidable  naval  armament  that 
ever  floated  on  the  ocean,  has  a  claim  upon  our  confidence  which 
mere  criticism  cannot  diminish  ;  and  a  claim  to'  be  adhered  to  in 
place  of  all  new  "  systems, until  time  and  trial  shall  have  neces- 
sitated (not  merely  justified)  the  change. 

If,  then,  we  refer  to  the  practice  of  other  nations  to  find  what 
has  been  judged  necessary  for  the  defence  of  important  ports — to 
experience,  to  find  how  such  defensive  systems  have  stood  the  test 
of  actual  trial,  we  may  draw  useful  conclusions  with  regard  to 
what  is  now  required  to  defend  New  York.  We  shall  find  at 
Sebastopol — a  narrow  harbor,  which  OAved  its  importance  to  its 
being  the  great  naval  depot  of  Russia,  on  the  Black  seaf — an  ar- 
ray of  700  guns,  about  500  of  which  were  placed  in  five  mason- 
ry-casemated"  works  (several  of  them  of  great  size),  and  the  re- 
mainder ii)  open  batteries. t  These  defensive  works  fulfilled  their 
object,  and  sustained  the  attack  of  the  allied  fleet  on  the  17th  of 
October,  1854,  without  sensible  damage. 

The  facility  with  which  sea-ports  are  attacked  by  fleets,  the 
enormous  preparations  required,  the  great  risks  encountered  in 
landing  a  besieging  army  on  the  coast  of  a  formidable  enemy 
(while,  for  protection  against  the  former  species  of  attack,  costly 
works  are  necessary,  and  against  the  latter,  field  works  and  men 
can,  in  emergency,  aff'ord  protection),  naturally  caused  the  Rus- 
sians to  make  these  water  defences  their  first  object.  Yet,  though 
almost  unprotected  on  the  land  side,  Sebastopol  resisted  for  a 

*  The  criticism  as  to  their  capacity  for  men  and  stores  is  scarcely  deserving  of  notice. 
When  they  are  merely  water-batteries  (as  most  of  them  are),  they  require  quarters  enough 
for  men  to  work  the  guns  (5  or  6  to  each  piece),  and  ammunition  storage  enough  for  one  or 
two  protracted  cannonades.  In  the  mere  service  of  the  guns  there  is  no  crowding  whatever. 

f  An  important  point,  surely;  but  how  small  its  importance,  and  the  interests  involved  in 
its  defence,  compared  with  iVeir  York  I 

X  It  is  worthy  to  remark,  that  the  only  battery  mentioned  as  silenced  by  the  allied  fire 
during  the  cannonade  of  the  17th  of  October,  1854,  is  that  of  the  Quarantine  Fort,  an  open 
barbette" — silenced,  as  Grivel  says,  malgre  Pabride  son  parapet  en  terre"  (notwithstand- 
ing the  shelter  of  its  earthen  parapet.) 


[Assembly 


whole  year  an  attack  on  that  quarter  ;  and  illnstrater!  how,  with 
plenty  of  men  and  material,  an  energetic  and  effectual  land  de- 
fence may  be  improvised,  where  the  sea  defence  is  provided  for, 
as  thoroughly  as  it  was  at  that  place.* 

Let  Crondstadt  be  another  example.  Great  as  was  the  import- 
ance of  its  defence  to  Russia,  it  was  not  greater,  it  was  by  no 
means  as  great,  as  that  of  New  York  to  our  own  country.  This 
port  and  military  and  naval  depot  was  defended  (in  its  main  ap- 
proach) by  upwards  of  600  guns,f  500  of  which  were  mounted 
in  five  "  masonry-casemated  ^'  works;  the  remainder  in  an  open 
barbette  battery,  which  enfiladed  the  main  channel.  This  num- 
ber is  formidable  in  itself;  yet  the  same  number  mounted  in  New 
York  harbor  would  not  afford  anything  like  such  a  formidable 
defence  as  was  found  at  Cronstadt,  owing  to  its  great  area,  and 
long  line  of  approach,  compared  with  the  latter.J 

These  works  fulfilled  their  object.  They  protected  the  great 
port  and  depot  of  Cronstadt  and  the  capital  of  the  empire  from 
invasion.  For  two  successive  years  did  the  mighty  armaments  of 
France  and  England  threaten ;  but  they  were  overawed  by  the 
frowning  array  of  "  casemated  castles  which  presented  itself, 
and  declined  the  contest. § 

Let  us  turn  our  eyes  now  to  the  great  naval  depot  of  France. 
After  the  almost  incredible  expenditure  lavished  here,  in  creating 
a  harbor  facing  the  shores  of  her  great  rival,  England,  and  an 
equally  profuse  expenditure  in  providing  all  that  constitutes  a 
great  naval  depot,  we  may  suppose  that  the  best  means,  without 
regard  to  cost,  which  the  science  of  man  could  devise,  would  bo 
employed  here,  to  make  this  great  seat  of  naval  power  secure 
against  the  formidable  means  of  attack  possessed  by  the  great 
maritime  power  most  likely  to  be  the  assailant.  The  means  there 
employed  are  (so  far  as  regards  mere  harbor  defence)  precisely 
the  same  (viz. :  casemated  works  in  several  tiers,  combined  with 
open  batteries,  where  the  locations  are  favorable) ;  and  the  appli- 
cation of  means  is  the  same  as  we  have  found  so  successful  in 
Russia,  the  same  which  constitutes  the  system  of  harbor  defence 
of  New  York. 

*  See  Appendix '«E." 

f  Besides  120  guns  on  two  ships  of  war,  stationed  so  as  to  rake  the  approach. 

J  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  defences  of  Sabastopol,  see  Appendix  "B." 

§  A  special  armament  was  being  fitted  out  in  England,  expressly  to  attack  Cronstadt,  had 
the  war  lasted  another  year.  It  consisted  of  several  hundred  "  floating-batteries,"  gun- 
boats, mortar-vessels,  <fec.,  &c.  It  would  have  been  interesting,  in  a  professional  point  of 
view,  to  have  seen  the  result;  but  it  is  quite  doubtful  after  all,  whether  the  Allies  would 
have  taken  the  bull  by  the  horns."  They  would  probably  have  directed  their  attack 
upon  the  shoal-water  approaches  between  the  Finland  shore  and  the  ielafid  of  Cronstadt. 


No.  58.] 


45 


PART  II. 

Let  us  now  consider  what,  in  the  present  state  of  the  art  of 
war,  and  in  the  light  of  the  experience  we  now  have,  is  required 
for  the  defence  of  the  port  and  city  of  New  York. 

In  commencing  this  paper,  I  have  ventured  to  call  this  problem 
a  modified  and  enlarged  one ;  the  course  of  the  previous  discus- 
sion will  have  shown,  however,  that  I  do  not  believe  that  we  know 
of  anything  particularly  new  in  the  means  to  be  employed.  It  is 
rather  in  the  amount  and  character  of  the  armaments  to  which 
New  York  will  be  exposed,  which  involves  a  new  consideration 
of  the  amount  and  arrangement  of  defensive  means. 

In  reviewing  the  recent  European  war,  we  are  struck  with  tho 
facility  with  which  immense  bodies  of  troops  are  transported  and 
maintained  in  a  distant  country,  which  of  itself  furnished  nothing. 
France  shipped  to  tho  Crimea  upwards  of  300,000  men,  and  Eng- 
land some  90  or  100,000.  We  cannot  doubt,  therefore,  that 
either  of  these  powers  aan  suddenly  equip  a  large  army,  transport 
it  over  the  ocean,  3,000  miles,  to  our  shores,  and  maintain  it  a 
year  or  more  in  a  hostile  attitude. 

(The  question  of  being  able  to  maintain  a  footing  on  our  shores^ 
is  quite  another  thing.) 

We  are  struck,  too,  by  the  immense  power  of  creation  possessed 
by  these  powers  (particularly  England),  in  calling  forth  all  man- 
ner of  warlike  military  and  naval  constructions.  It  seemed  as  if 
the  governments  had  but  to  will,  and  the  immense  manufacturing 
establishments  and  ship-yards  of  England  were  capable  of  re- 
sponding to  the  most  unlimited  demands,  in  the  briefest  possible 
time.  Taught,  by  the  experience  of  two  seasons,  the  inutility  of 
ordinary  naval  meaj;is  ag;ainst  the  Russian  defences  in  the  Baltic, 
a  flotilla  of  several  hundred  vessels,  gun-boats  of  different  sizes, 
bearing  pieces  of  the  most  formidable  calibres,  mortar-vessels, 
"floating-batteries,"  dispatch  vessels,  &c.,  all  propelled  by  steam, 
were  constructed  in  an  incredibly  short  space  of  time.* 

Such  flotillas  could  be  created  with  the  same  facility  and  sent 
to  our  shores,  if  there  should  be  found  a  sufficient  motive  for  it. 

The  third  point  which  attracts  attention,  is  the  peculiarly  ma- 
ritime character  of  the  war.  It  is  not  by  marching  armies  into 
the  interior  of  the  enemy's  territory,  but  by  assailing  his  maritime 

*  A  brief  account  of  these  vessels,  taken  from  an  interesting  paper,  Notes  and  Observa- 
tions on  the  Review  at  Spithead,  by  Commander  W.  M.  Walker,  U.  S.  Navy,"  will  be 
found  in  Appendix  C." 


46 


[Assembly 


seats  of  population,  wealth  and  power,  that  the  war  was  pro- 
secuted ;  and  one  of  their  great  maritime  depots  became  the  true 
seat  of  war,  about  which  its  issue  was  decided. 

The  lesson  to  be  derived  by  ourselves  is  too  obvious  to  be 
dwelt  upon.  Our  own  great  maritime  places  would  be  the  points 
at  which  alone  an  European  enemy  could  hope  to  strike  great 
blows;  JYew  York  preeminently.  If  it  is  left  undefended,  or  is 
inadequately  defended,  its  immense  commerce,  its  rich  depots  of 
wealth  and  military  and  naval  resources,  the  lives  and  property 
of  its  citizens,  will  be,  throughout  the  whole  period  of  the  war,  at 
an  unpitying  enemy's  mercy ;  and  the  national  honor  will  suffer 
an  indelible  stain,  by  such  a  degradation  of  its  great  commercial 
emporium.  If  defended  as  it  should  be,  its  defences  must  be  cal- 
culated to  grapple  with  such  armaments  as  we  know  can  and  will 
be  brought  against  it ;  and  upon  the  success  of  the  contest,  im- 
mense consequences,  perhaps,  as  at  Sabastopol,  the  issue  of  the 
war,  will  depend. 

The  Boards  of  Engineers  who  have  recently  had  under  consi- 
deration portions  of  the  defensive  system  of  New  York,  have  not 
been  insensible  that  great  additional  strength  was  now  required, 
over  what  had  been  considered  sufficient  in  former  years.  But 
they  have  never  had  time  (each  member  being  charged  with 
onerous  individual  duties)  to  take  that  patient  survey  of  the  whole 
subject  which  it  requires.  Moreover  they  have  only  been  called 
upon  to  decide  projects  of  particular  works  ;  and  I  may  add,  that 
it  is  only  quite  recently  that  we  have  had  the  means  of  taking 
this  re-survey  of  our  wants,  with  the  full  light  which  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  events  of  the  recent  European  war  alone  could 
give  us. 

It  would  be  presumptuous  in  me  to  say  exactly  what  new 
works,  or  what  new  arrangements  are  required  ;  but  I  can  say, 
with  confidence,  that  the  security  of  New  York  requires  a  vast 
addition  to  what  now  exists ;  that  it  demands  their  prompt  execu- 
tion; and,  enlightened  by  previous  labors  of  the  Board  of  Engi- 
neers, and  by  the  opinions  of  officers  of  experience,  can  point  out, 
in  a  general  way,  what  is  necessary,  or,  at  least,  what  I  believe 
to  be  so. 

First — The  Narrows  is  the  great  avenue  of  approach  to  New 
York,  and  the  shores  being  there  barely  one  mile  apart,  they  fur- 
nish the  means  of  a  most  formidable  defence.  I  have  before 
alluded  to  the  difficulty  of,  by  mere  array  of  batteries,  absolutely 


No.  58.J 


47 


sealing  a  channel  against  the  rapid  passage  of  vessels.  The  true 
principle,  therefore,  for  the  defence  of  an  object  like  New  York, 
of  such  importance  that  the  mere  passage  of  the  batteries  would 
be  risked,  is,  not  only  to  make  those  batteries  of  the  most  formi- 
dable nature,  but  so  to  array  batteries  that  the  entire  waters,  not 
only  of  the  channel  of  approach,  but  those  in  which  the  enemy 
must  lie  in  his  after  offensive  operations,  shall  be  under  their 
fire.*  The  Board  of  Engineers  has  already  considered  the  nature 
and  extent  of  additional  works  at  the  Narrows  ;  and  so  far  as  the 
first  condition  of  a  formidable  array  of  batteries  is  concerned,  I 
think  they  have  met  all  the  requisites.  They  have  decided  that 
there  should  be,  at  this  passage,  batteries  sufficient  to  concentrate 
a  fire  of  300  guns  upon  every  point  of  a  vessels  path  within  range. 
When  we  consider  the  character  of  the  armament  intended  for 
these  works,!  it  will  be  admitted  that  the  passage,  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances,  will  be  a  thing  of  no  ordinary  risk. 
Combined  with  the  use  of  obstructions^  either  floating  or  fixed, 
and  of  floating  defences  on  our  part,  the  defence  can  be  made  of 
the  most  formidable  character. 

But  such  an  array  of  batteries  does  not  now  exist.  To  accom- 
plish it,  we  require,  on  Staten  Island,  besides  Fort  Richmond, 
(nearly  completed)  the  completion  of  Fort  Tompkins  (just  com- 
menced) ;  the  construction  of  another  casemated  battery  south 
of  Fort  Richmond,  (for  which  plans  are  proposed)  and  the  exten- 
sion of  the  ^arthen  batteries.  Fort  Tompkins  will  cost  about 
$650,000,  and  the  new  battery  and  earthen  works  about  as  much 
more;  or  $1,300,000  in  all,  for  the  works  yet  to  be  constructed 
on  Staten  Island. 

This  is  but  for  the  Staten  Island  side  of  the  Narrows.  To 
provide  the  concentration  of  300  guns  upon  the  passage,  and  to 
command  the.Avaters  of  Gravesend  Bay,  the  works  on  the  Long 
Island  side  must  be  enlarged  by  extending  batteries  (either  open 
or  casemated)  along  the  blulf  below  Fort  Hamilton,  and  Fort 
Lafayette  must  be  remodeled.  As  the  additional  works  on  this 
side  have  not  been  planned,  I  can  only  say  that  I  suppose  that 
an  expenditure^'of  about  $500,000  will  be  required  on  the  Long 
Island  shore. 

So  much  for  the  defences  of  the  Narrows;  but  to  fulfill  the 
condition,  that  an  enemy's  fleet  shall  be  kept  underfire  wherever 

*  See  Appendix  "D." 

f  8"  and  10''  Columbiads,  and  42-pounders  for  hot  shot,  and  8-inch  seacoast  howitzers 
for  the  shorter  ranges. 


4S  [Assembly 

he  may  be,*  one  or  more  works  are  required  to  fill  the  gap 
between  the  Narrows  and  the  interior  line  of  works,  on  Bedlow's 
and  Governor's  Islands.  At  least  one  such  work  should  be  built 
on  Robbins'  Reef — a  site  about  midway  between  the  Narrows  and 
Governor's  Island,  which  rakes  the  approach  through  the  Nar- 
rows and  commands  the  outlets  of  the  "  Kills."  A  work  on  this 
site  may  be  roughly  estimated  at  $500,000. 

The  foregoing  are  what,  I  think,  are  imperatively  demanded 
for  the  Narrows  approach  to  the  city.  They  include  (Fort  Rich- 
mond being  nearly  completed)  the  construction  of  two  new  works 
on  Staten  Island,  Fort  Tompkins  (just  commenced)  and  the  new 
projected  casemated  battery ;  of  additional  works  at  Fort  Ham- 
ilton, and  the  remodeling  of  Fort  Lafayette ;  and  the  construc- 
tion of  at  least  one  new  work  on  Robbins'  Reef,  and  an  expendi- 
ture of  from  two  to  three  millions  of  dollars. 

But  to  prevent  the  occupation  of  the  outer  harbor  and  a  dis- 
embarkation in  Gravesend  Bay,  and  march  on  Brooklyn,  other 
works  are  required,  and  they  may  be  so  arranged,  w^hile  they  ful- 
fill these  objects,  as  to  add  greatly  to  the  risks  an  enemy  w^ould 
encounter  in  reaching  New  York  with  his  fleet. 

To  prevent  disembarkation  in  Gravesend  Bay,  a  work  seems 
indispensable  on  the  point  of  Coney  Island.  Such  a  work,  in 
conjunction  with  the  proposed  new  batteries  at  Fort  Hamilton, 
would  sweep  the  waters  of  Gravesend  Bay,  and  take  up  fire  upon 
a  fleet  attempting  the  passage  of  the  Narrows,  at  a  lower  point 
than  the  Narrows  batteries,  crossing  fire  with  them.  It  may 
indeed,  in  conjunction  with  another  work  to  be  mentioned  here- 
after, be  made  to  constitute  another  and  outer  line  of  defence  to 
the  Narrows  approach. 

The  work  on  Sandy  Hook,  authorized  by  Congress,  and  just 
being  commenced,  is  intended,  mainly,  to  prevent  the  occupation 
and  use  of  the  outer  bay  by  an  enemy's  fleet. 

It  does  not  thoroughly  seal  all  the  entrances  to  that  bay ;  but 
if  the  works  I  have  described  exist  above,  he  will  not  encounter 
the  fire  of  Sandy  Hook  with  no  greater  object  than  merely  to 
enter  the  bay.  To  make  a  more  perfect  defence  of  these  outer 
waters,  however,  a  work  on  the  ''West  Bank"  is  desirable, 
which  would  command  the  mouth  of  all  the  lesser  entrances  to 
the  outer  harbor,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  Coney  Island  work. 


*  The  fulfillment  of  this  condition  would  be  completed  by  throwing  up  temporary  batte- 
ries along  the  East  and  North  rivers,  in  the  city  and  opposite  the  shorea. 


No.  58.] 


49 


form  the  outer  line  of  the  Narrows  defences,  already  mentioned. 
Perhaps,  too,  a  work  on  the  Romer  shoal  which  should  co-operate 
with  Sandy  Hook,  and  command  the  "  Swash "  and  "  East 
channels,  might  be  judged  expedient. 

The  work  on  Sandy  Hook  will  cost  $2,000,000  ;  and  as  to  those 
I  have  mentioned,  it  can  only  be  stated  that  they  would  require 
something  like  $2,000,000  more. 

The  narrow  passage  around  Staten  Island  through  the  Kills 
can  be  passed  by  light-draught  gun-boats  and  similar  craft.  It 
can  be  easily  defended  by  obstructions  or  shore  batteries ;  but 
whichever  means  are  resorted  to,  some  shore  works  sufficiently 
strong  to  endure  an  assault  are  necessary.  I  only  point  out  the 
fact,  without  attempting  to  indicate  what  they  should  be. 

The  East  river  approach  is  defended  by  the  formidable  work 
of  Fort  Schuyler.  Another  work  opposite  to  it,  on  Willett's 
Point,  is  deemed  necessary ;  and  the  two  will,  with  such  auxiliary 
means  as  can  be  easily  provided  in  time  of  war,  complete  the 
defence.  The  w^ork  on  Willett's  Point  may  be  set  down  at  the 
same  cost  as  Fort  Schuyler,  $800,000. 

I  have  now  indicated  in  a  very  general  way  what  I  suppose 
necessary  to  put  New  York  in  a  satisfactory  state  of  security. 
I  have  shown,  or  have  attempted  to  show,  not  only  that  it  was 
not  now  in  such  a  state,  but  that  works  requiring  some  six  or 
eight  millions  of  dollars  are  imperatively  demanded.  The  sum 
is  large,  it  is  true ;  but  it  is  only  about  the  amount  of  revenue 
collected  here  in  two  months.  If  I  have  convinced  you,  as  I  have 
tried  to  do,  and  as  I  certainly  believe,  that  in  our  next  war  with 
a  great  maritime  power,  more  important  issues  will  be  involved 
in  the  adequate  defence  of  New  York  than  in  almost  any  other 
preparation,  defensive  or  offensive,  we  can  make,  then  I  shall  not 
fear  that  you  or  the  nation  will  consider  the  millions  required 
disproportionate  to  the  object.  I  believe  that  the  people  of  the 
United  States  can  and  will  be  made  to  understand  that  the 
defence  of  New  York  is  a  national^  and  not  a  local  question;  and 
as  such  will  be  willing  to  provide  for  it. 

If  I  am  asked  when  these  works  should  be  undertaken,  I 
answer  that  I  consider  that  all  those  that  involve  the  defence  of 
the  Narrows  are  so  immensely  important  to  New  York  that  they 
should  be  commenced  immediately,  and  carried  on  with  the  largest 
appropriations  that  can  be  advantageously'  applied,  to  completion  ; 

[Assem.  No.  58.]  7 


60 


[Assembly 


and  simultaneously  with  them,  the  work  on  <^oney  Island. 
^  These  works  (Fort  Tompkins,  the  new  water-battery  on  Staten 
Island,  the  additional  works  at  Fort  Hamilton,  and  the  work  on 
Coney  Island)  will  cost  about  $2,000,000  ;  and  I  urgently  recom- 
mend that  at  least  $500,000  be  asked  from  Congress  for  them. 

The  works  just  mentioned  (with  the  work  on  Sandy  Hook,  also 
in  progress,)  would  place  this  approach  in  a  respectable  state  of 
defence ;  and  the  other  works  in  the  outer  bay  could  be  com- 
menced at  a  later  period;  but  all  that  are  decided  by  competent 
authority  to  he  necessary  should  be  built  as  soon  as  possible. 

A  complete  view  of  the  dangers  and  defences  of  New  York 
requires  some  allusion  to  the  subject  of  an  invasion  by  land,  and 
particularly  from  Long  Island.  The  idea  of  such  a  danger  has 
nothing  whatever  of  novelty  in  it.  That  the  British  army  actu- 
ally did  land  in  Gravesend  Bay — defeat  the  Continental  forces 
under  Gen.  Washington,  at  Brooklyn,  and  capture  New  York,  is 
well  known  That,  to  prevent  the  repetition  of  such  an  opera- 
tion during  the  last  war,  a  large  body  of  militia  was  called  out, 
is  equally  well  known ;  and  the  liability  to  a  repetition  of  such 
an  attack  has  been  dwelt  upon  in  almost  every  official  paper 
treating  of  the  defencee  of  New  York. 

The  Chief  Egineer,  General  Totten,  proposed  to  secure  the 
city  from  danger  in  this  particular  quarter  by  an  outer  harrier; 
and  if  the  outer  bay  could  be  ejffectually  closed,  of  course  the 
danger  would  be  removed.  But  so  to  close  it  will  require  works* 
which,  if  built  at  allj  will  not  probably  be  very  soon. 

The  subject  has  been  before  almost  every  Board  of  Engineers 
that  has  had  the  defence  of  New  York  under  consideration,  from 
1816  to  the  present  time.  They  have  presented  no  formal  plan 
that  I  recollect,  for  land  defences  on  Long  Island,  (at  least  not 
of  late  years,)  for  they  have  always  found  other  demands  con- 
cerning the  defences  of  New  York  far  more  pressing ;  and  have 
probably  thought,  too,  that  while  the  general  character  of  the 
defence  was  sufficiently  obvious,  every  year  that  elapsed  would 
alter  the  details  of  the  problem. 

There  are  two  or  three  very  broad  principles  bearing  on  this 
subject,  which  I  think  every  one  will  assent  to. 

First:  A  landing  in  the  face  of  such  a  force  as  could  speedily 
be  concentrated  (or  rather  such  as  always  would  be  at  hand  in 
New  York)  is  an  operation  of  great  risk^  as  well  as  great  labor, 

*  It  is  not  anticipated  that  the  work  on  Sauday  Hook  can  alone  close  this  bay. 


Nq.  58.] 


61 


requiring  special  means  and  arrangements.  JVo  enemy  will  take 
this  course  so  long  as  he  can  with  his  fleet  (or  with  vessels  specially 
adapted  to  the  object)  reach  the  city  and  effect  his  object  without 
a  landing.  While,  therefore,  this  latter  operation  is  open  to  an 
enemy,  while  he  can  with  his  fleet,  or  the  gun-boats,  or  the  float- 
ing batteries  of  his  fleet,  force  his  way  within  range  of  the  city 
from  his  shell-guns  or  curved  fire,  the  question  of  danger  from 
land  attacks  sinks  into  utter  insignificance. 

The  works  to  prevent  this  latter  operation  are  of  great  mag- 
nitude, as  I  have  endeavored  to  show  in  the  course  of  this  paper ; 
require  large  amounts  of  money,  and  much  time  to  complete. 
Those  to  prevent  the  former  (land  attack)  are  of  a  comparatively 
trivial  character.  I  concur,  in  fact,  with  the  opinion  expressed 
by  yourself,  sir,  in  your  annual  report,  that  (at  least  until  the 
harbor  defences  are  completed)  nothing  but  earth  works,  to  be 
thrown  up  in  time  of  war,  are  necessary.* 

Second :  All  the  arguments  which  opposers  to  our  system  of 
coast  defences  have  of  late  years  brought  forward,  bear  with  their 
full  force  upon  our  defensive  strength  m  this  relation;  not  at  all 
upon  the  degree  of  strength  required  for  harbor  defences.  In  the 
words  of  a  M^ury,  if  the  "  greatest  army  that  ever  was  led  into 
battle  by  the  greatest  captain"  were  to  land  on  Long  Island, 
and  be  disembarking  his  last  piece  of  artillery  before  he  was 
discovered — these  railroads,  the  power  of  steam,  with  the  aid  of 
lightning,  Tfould  enable  the  government,  before  he  could  reach 
the  heights  of  Brooklyn,  to  have  there  in  waiting,  and  ready  to 
receive  him  and  beat  him  back  into  the  sea,  a  force  two  to  one 
greater  than  his,  however  strong  and  Major  W.  H.  Chase,  (in  a 
quotation  already  given,)  has  expressed  opinions  if  not  quite  so 
strong  as  these,  somewhat  similar.  It  is  not  necessary  to  em- 
brace the  particular  views  of  either  of  these  officers  to  acknowl- 
edge that  there  is  force  in  their  arguments. 

Third.  The  great  danger  to  New  York  and  its  dependencies 
from  this  kind  of  an  attack,  is  from  the  safe  and  convenient  land- 
ing at  Gravesend,  and  the  short  line  of  march  thence  to  Brook- 
lyn. Should  we  find  ourselves  engaged  in  war,  with  no  other  de- 
fence in  this  quarter  than  those  now  existing,  prompt  and  ener- 
getic measures  would  have  to  be  taken  to  improvise  a  defence 

*  I  consider,  however,  that  the  work  on  Coney  Island  should  be  immediately  built,  to 
prevent  a  landing  in  Gravesend  Bay,  or  on  Coney  Island ;  but  this  is  not  included  in  the 
category  of  land  defences,  as  advocated  by  others. 


52  [Assembly 

against  this  danger ;  and  doubtless  prompt  and  energetic  measures 
could  and  would  be  taken. 

With  the  work  I  propose  on  Coney  Island,  however,  this  land- 
ing  becomes  unavailable,  and  the  danger  of  land  attack  on  Brook- 
lyn or  New  York  becomes  comparatively  insignificant.  A  land- 
ing', as  before  remarked,  in  the  face  of  the  dense  and  warlike  pop- 
ulation of  New  York,  augmented  as  the  numerical  force  of  its  de- 
fenders may  be,  in  a  day  or  two,  by  overwhelming  numbers  from 
other  quarters,  is  one  of  the  most  dangerous  operations  of  war. 
It  will  not  be  undertaken  on  the  07)671  ^ea-^^org  of  Long  Island, 
where  at  any  moment  the  disembarked  force  would  be  liable  to 
have  its  communication  with  its  fleet  cut  off.  It  would  only  be 
made  from  Long  Island  Sound,  whence  a  march  of  fifteen  or 
twenty  miles,  at  the  shortest,  would  be  necessary  to  reach  Brook- 
lyn. At  whatever  rate  such  a  danger  may  be  estimated,  it  is  suf- 
ficient to  say  that  in  twenty-four  hours  after  a  declaration  of  war 
(if  thought  necessary)  an  army  of  50,000  men  may  be  entrenched 
on  the  line  of  approach  to  Brooklyn. 

The  work  on  Willett's  Point  will,  by  no  means7  have  an  insig- 
nificant bearing  on  such  defence.  To  "  leave  it  behind"  is  not 
simply  to  leave  a  fortification  in  the  enemy's  rear  ;  it  is  to  have 
in  his  rear  an  entrenched  "  tete-de-'pont,''^  whence  in  twen+y-four 
hours  an  overwhelming  force  may  he  thrown  from  the  JYew  York 
side  upon  his  rear,  cutting  him  off  from  his  fleet. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  say  in  this  connection,  that  the  policy 
of  our  government,  and  of  the  Engineer  Department,  has  always 
been  (and  I  conceive,  always  should  be)  first,  to  close  all  the  great 
approaches  hy  water,  leading  to  our  dock-yards,  commercial  cities, 
&c.,  and  to  locate  their  defences  in  such  a  manner  as  to  force  any 
landing  that  may  he  attempted  to  as  great  a  distance  as  possible. 
The  defence  against  approaches  by  an  army  landing,  must  be  by 
our  troops,  (surely  if  the  nation  and  the  people  have  in  themselves 
any  inherent  power  of  self-defence,  it  is  here  they  can  meet  the 
foe  and  "  beat  him  back  into  the  sea,")  with  the  assistance  of 
temporary  works,  and  all  the  expedients  of  engineering  talent 
and  skill,  on  such  route  as  an  enemy  may  have  selected.  But  to 
leave  the  coast  and  construct  a  girdle  of  forts  about  any  of  our 
cities  as  they  now  exist,  would  be  as  wise  as  to  have  constructed 
permanent  defences  along  Brooklyn  and  Harlem  Heights,  where 
they  were  made  in  1814  and  '15,  now  within  the  cities,  and  to  be 
traced  or  known  only  from  old  maps  and  plans.    Fort  Greene, 


No.  58.] 


53 


one  of  the  commanding  sites  of  the  Brooklyn  line  of  1814-^15, 
has  been  not  only  occupied  by  the  city,  but  its  commanding  emi- 
nence leveled.  Nothing  short  of  the  power  of  a  despotic  gov- 
ernment, with  ability  to  take  possession  of  hundreds  of  acres  (and 
dwellings),  and  forbid  the  erection  of  any  structures  either  upon 
the  sites  or  within  gun-shot  of  them^  could  accomplish  the  scheme 
of  either  establishing  a  girdle  of  works  about  Brooklyn,  or  secure 
permanently  the  sites  for  them. 

The  fact  that  sites,  deemed  eligible  tioiij,  are  being  built  upon,  is 
the  best  proof  that  they  are  becoming  no  longer  so. 

Whether  these  propositions  are  admitted  or  not,  it  is  most  cer- 
tain that,  at  present,  the  great  "  dangers"  of  New  York  are 
through  the  inadequately  defended  water  approaches.  It  is  to 
these  dangers  I  most  urgently  call  your  attention,  and  the  atten- 
tion of  Congress  and  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  for  it  is 
not  a  question  of  local,  but  of  national  concern. 

This  paper  has  swollen  to  a  length  unanticipated  by  me  in 
commencing  it ;  but  I  have  judged  it  imperative  at  a  period  in 
our  growth  as  a  nation,  and  in  the  history  of  our  relations  with 
the  other  great  powers  of  the  world,  when,  I  conceive,  the  sub- 
ject of  security  to  our  great  cities  and  ports  has  acquired  more 
than  ordinary  urgency,  and  when  at  the  same  time  the  very  prin- 
ciples on  which  such  security  can  be  obtained  are  called  in  ques- 
tion, to  review  thoroughly  the  whole  subject,  glancing  at  the  ar- 
guments (A  past  years  to  see  how  they  have  been  justified  by  the 
progress  of  events,  and  discussing  at  length  the  occurrences  of 
the  recent  European  war  which  bear  on  this  subject.  If  I  shall 
convince  you  that  there  is  urgent  and  immediate  necessity  for 
prosecuting  in  the  most  energetic  manner  all  the  defensive  works 
now  authorized  by  Congress  for  the  defence  of  New  York,  and  of 
commencing  new  ones  without  delay — and  if,  by  means  of  this 
paper,  I  shall  awaken  the  attention  not  only  of  the  people  of  New 
York,  but  of  all  who  take  the  safety,  honor  and  welfare"  of 
their  country  to  heart,  to  the  importance  of  the  subject,  my  ob- 
ject will  be  accomplished. 


[AsSEMBtr 


APPENDIX. 
[A.] 

The  following  description  of  the  manner  of  construction  and 
materials  used  ^  in  some  of  the  Russian  and  Prussian  works  (Bo- 
marsund  among  others)  is  interesting ;  and  will  illustrate  the 
degree  of  authority  belonging  to  the  assertion  just  quoted.  It 
is  derived  from  authentic  sources. 

The  masonry  is  described  as  of  boulders,  with  one  end  broken 
off  to  form  the  face  ;  then  the  sides  broken,  to  give  beds  and 
builds  of  every  variety  of  shape,  varying  in  the  number  of  sides, 
their  length,  and  hence,  angles  made  with  each  other.  No  stone 
other  than  the  Finland  granite,  scattered  over  the  surface  in 
boulders,  is  available  in  a  large  part  of  northern  Europe.  These 
are  used  for  the  face  of  the  wall,  the  filling  being  brick  or  other 
masonry.  The  result  is  a  facing  of  most  excellent  material  for 
durability  as  to  time,  but  very  inferior  and  of  little  or  no 
strength  in  bond.  The  stones  are  left  with  rounded  surfaces 
on  the  back,  and  present  uo  bond  of  any  value,  and  in  size  vary 
as  they  were  picked  from  the  fields,  every  stone  being  worked  to 
its  largest  dimensions  for  a  face,  and  cut  to  fit  the  adjacent  ones 
previously  laid. 

Thus,  for  example,  the  face  of  the  walls  are  formed.  The 
joints  perpendicular  to  the  face,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  vary 
in  depth,  according  to  the  size  of  the  boulders,  and  the  bed 
into  which  it  is  being  prepared  to  be  laid,  varying  from  6  to  12 
inches  in  a  work  witnessed  under  construction.  None  of  the 
stones  could  be  considered  as  large ;  altogether  and  exceedingly 
indifferent  character  of  masonry  to  resist  artillery,  although 
good  against  weather  and  escalade.  Such  were  the  Bomarsund 
towers  and  casemated  water-battery.  At  Cronstadt  the  masonry 
of  the  scarps  and  the  water  fronts  is  superior  to  any  masonry  to 
be  found  in  the  fortifications  of  Europe  ;  and  equal  in  every  res- 
pect to  that  in  our  dry-docks  at  Brooklyn  and  Norfolk.  At  Se- 
bastopol  it  was  very  indifferent  as  to  the  size  and  quality  of  the 
material,  though  well  put  together,  being  of  headers  and  stretchers, 
with  horizontal  beds  and  vertical  joints ;  but  in  pieces  from  8  to 
12  inches  rise,  and  2  to  4  feet  in  length  for  the  stretchers, 
and  the  mortar  not  very  hard.    The  coping  of  the  docks  and 


No.  5a] 


55 


sea-wall  of  the  dock  harbor  was  excellent,  and  of  large  blocks 
of  Finland  granite,  and  what  appeared  to  be  Quincy  granite  ; 
but  the  scarps  of  the  MalakofF,  the  crenated  wall  on  the  west  of  the 
city,  and  the  harbor  casemated  forts,  were  very  poor  masonry, 
both  in  quality  of  material  and  its  small  size ;  the  material 
not  as  good  as  the  Connecticut  sandstone  in  some  of  our  old  har- 
bor defences. 

[B.J 

The  following  more  detailed  account  of  the  defences  of  Cron- 
stadt  and  Sebastopol,  is  derived  from  an  authentic  source  : 

The  Russians  gave  their  attention,  first  to  securing  the  dock- 
yards and  establishment  at  Cronst^dt.  By  permanent  casemated 
batteries,  upon  precisely  the  same  principles  we  have  adopted 
(differing  in  some  details  only),  they  closed  the  main  entrance 
against  large  and  small  vessels  ;  and  were  adding,  during  the 
existence  of  the  contest,  to  these  casemated  defences,  in  the  con- 
struction of  a  new  work  on  the  shoal  opposite  Cronstadt  (south 
side  of  main  channel).  The  narrow  circuitous  channels  through 
the  shoals,  from  the  island  of  Cronstadt  to  the  Finland  shore, 
were  defended  by  hulk  ships  permanently  anchored  at  advanta- 
geous positions  ;  as  was,  likewise,  the  shoal  water  between  the 
island  of  Cronstadt  and  the  main  land  to  the  southward.  A 
numerous  flotilla  of  steam  propellers  and  sailing  gun-boats,  with 
many  boals  propelled  with  oars,  armed  each  with  a  heavy  gun, 
together  with  many  steam  sloops  of  war,  were  ready  to  operate 
anywhere  about  or  on  the  shoals ;  their  services  would  be  most 
available  at  critical  moments. 

The  city  of  Cronstadt,  on  the  eastern  end  of  the  island,  was 
inclosed  by  permanent  fortifications. 

On  the  western  side,  crossing  the  island,  these  works  took  in 
every  building  of  the  commercial  city  and  naval  dock-yards  ; 
but  were  so  near  as  to  have  brought  destruction  upon  the  city 
and  naval  establishment,  by  any  siege  operations  carried  on 
against  the  permanent  defences.  To  obviate  this  serious  diffi- 
culty, a  line  of  entrenchments  was  thrown  up  across  the  island, 
far  in  advancts  of  the  permanent  works.  These  entrenchments 
were  armed  with  heavy  ships'  guns,  having  ditches  commanded 
by  concealed  caponiers,  fraised  and  palisaded. 

Such  were  the  defences  of  the  main  ship-channel  to  St.  Peters- 
burg and  the  naval  establishment,  against ^oa^/w^  offensive  ope- 


56 


[Assembly 


rations.  Within  this  line  the  city  of  St.  Petersburg  is  approach- 
ed only  through  shoal  water  and  among  islands. 

All  these  channels  were  commanded  by  temporarily-construct- 
ed batteries,  mounting  from  6  to  12  heavy  guns,  on  wrought-iron 
carriages. 

But  the  city  of  St.  Petersburg  on  the  land,  and  the  whole 
coast  and  shores  from  it,  down  to  the  enemy's  anchorage,  on  the 
north  and  south,  were  bare  of  lines  or  entrenchments  of  any 
kind. 

A  large  army  was  in  camp  south  of  St.  Petersburg,  ready  to 
march  at  any  moment,  to  oppose  a  landing,  or  meet  any  troops 
the  allies  might  venture  to  land.  Both  at  Cronstadt  and  Sebas- 
topol,  as  well  as  Sweaborg,  Bomarsund  and  Riga,  their  defences 
were  in  progress  of  construction,  or  rather  unfinished ;  those  at 
Cronstadt  being  actually  under  construction,  both  in  the  dock- 
yard and  casemated  forts  ;  but  the  land  defences  they  had  the 
good  sense  to  omit,  until  the  great  and  open  route  by  water  had 
been  secured.  This  latter  object  they  had  most  successfully  at- 
tained at  Sebastopol,  that  resisted  the  combined  attack  of  the 
most  powerful  armament  Europe  could  bring  to  bear  against 
fortifications  ;  and  the  works  thus  prepared  effectually  served  to 
protect  the  fleet,  dock-yards,  city,  and  all  they  were  destined  to 
secure.  But  time  did  not  enable  the  Russians  to  carry  out  their 
plans  to  cover  the  land  side  of  these  harbor  defences.  On  the 
west  of  the  city  they  had  a  crenated  scarp,  which  held  out  to 
the  last  against  the  French.  Along  the  south  they  had  nothing 
but  the  little  Malakoff  tower,  of  two  tiers  of  loop-holes  for  infan- 
try, and  five  guns  in  barbette — a  work  with  a  circular  trace,  the 
gorge  not  exceeding  27  feet  radius  (out  to  out),  admitting  of  5 
loop  holes  only  on  each  side  of  the  door.  Temporary  earthen 
works  were  hastily  thrown  up,  on  ground  most  advantageously 
formed  for  such  a  noble  and  gallant  defence  as  the  Russian  engi- 
neer's skill  enabled  him  to  call  into  action ;  while  the  resources 
of  an  immense  fleet  enabled  him  to  arm  and  equip  his  works. 

A  first,  second,  and  even  third  line  of  defences,  the  two  latter 
always  in  advance  of  their  first,  occupying  positions  on  the  crest 
of  the  dock-yard  hills,  the  Russian  engineers  pushed  forward  to 
meet  their  allied  enemy ;  but  no  permanent  works  of  any  kind 
existed  to  oppose  the  allies  on  the  south,  saving  the  little,  ex- 
posed, masonry  Malakoff,  the  stone  of  which  was  no  better  than 
some  of  our  best  mortar,  and  was  destroyed  from  a  distance  of 


No.  58.] 


57 


more  than  1,500  yards,  by  the  first  battery  constructed  against 
it.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Russians  labored  under  every 
disadvantage  from  the  temporary  character  of  their  works;  and 
it  is  very  certain  that  neither  the  Redan  nor  KornilofF  bastion 
(the  Malakoff)  would  have  been  entered  by  a  French  or  English 
soldier  to  the  day  the  Russians  evacuated  them,  had  there  existed 
either  a  masonry  counterscarp,  or  scarp  with  suitable  bomb-proofs, 
for  the  Russian  troops.  Another  winter's  campaign  would  unques- 
tionably have  been  necessary,  had  the  works  been  of  this  more 
permanent  character  ;  and  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the 
resources  of  the  Allies  could  have  equaled  such  a  prolonged 
contest. 

[  c.  ] 

The  floating  batteries  are  of  very  uncouth  and  unwieldy 
appearance,  partaking  in  model  about  equally  of  a  canal  boat 
and  a  galliot.  In  general,  their  construction  is  that  of  iron  ships  ; 
the  decks  are  of  9-inch  plank  resting  upon  lOJ-inch  beams, 
placed  1  foot  9  inches  from  centre  to  centre ;  the  "  top  sides " 
are  covered  with  6-inch  plank,  over  which,  extending  to  3  feet 
below  the  water  line,  is  a  sheathing  of  wrought-iron  plates,  14 
feet  long,  20  inches  wide,  and  4J  inches  thick,  each  secured  to 
the  hull  by  1  J-inch  screw  bolts.  They  are  brig-rigged,  are  fitted 
with  non-condensing  engines  and  screw  propellers,  and  can 
make,  undeft^  steam  alone,  4J  to  5  knots.  They  are  pierced 
for  30  guns,  and  mount  from  14  to  16  sixty-eights. 

DIMENSIONS. 

Horse  Extreme 

power.     Length.      breadth.         Depth.  Draft. 

Meteor   150       173       43.6       14.7  7.9 

Thunderbolt   200       186       48.6       18.6  6.6 

The  only  vessel  of  this  class  which  has  been  tested  in  action 
was  under  French  colors  in  the  attack  upon  Kinburn.  She  was 
struck  in  the  hull  58  times,  without  receiving  any  other  injury 
than  the  indentation  of  the  plates  to  depths  varying  from  one- 
fourth  to  one  and  one-fourth  inches.*  Of  important  particulars 
respecting  the  alleged  invulnerability  of  these  vessels,  I  could 
get  no  account,  and  must  admit  a  want  of  faith  in  it. 

*  See  Dahlgren's  account,  p.  27  et  seq.,  ante.  Xothing  heavier  than  a  32-pound  shot 
was  fired  by  the  Russian  batteries  at  Kinburn. — (Author's  note.) 


[Assem.  No.  58. J 


8 


58 


[Assembly 


The  raortar  boats  are  cutter-rigged  vessels  of  ab^at  70  tons, 
very  much  resembling  in  general  form  and  appearance  the 
"  Anchor  Hoy,"  which  was  formerly,  and  perhaps  still  may  be, 
attached  to  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard.  Their  draft  is  five  feet. 
Each  mounts  a  13-inch  mortar. 

GuN-BOATS. — The  largest  of  these  vessels  are  three-masted 
schooners,  of  fine  models,  of  800  tons,  and  210  feet  long,  with 
engines  of  350  horse-power,  and  a  speed  under  steam  of  10  to 
11^  knots. 

They  have  a  crew  of  100  men,  and  their  armament  consists  of 
two  68-pounders,  of  95  cwt.,  on  pivots — one  between  the  fore 
and  main  masts  and  one  on  the  forecastle — and  four  32-pounder8 
on  truck  carriages.  The  most  note-worthy  peculiarity  of  these 
craft  is  the  arrangement  of  their  boilers,  which  is  as  follows  : 
Their  light  draft  renders  it  impossible  to  place  the  boilers  out  of 
danger  below  the  water  line,  without  occupying  too  much  of  the 
floor  of  the  vessel ;  therefore  they  are  furnished  with  two  descrip- 
tions of  boiler — the  "service"  and  the  "fighting"  boiler.  The 
first  is  of  the  usual  form  of  British  marine  boiler ;  the  latter, 
cylinder  tubular.  For  ordinary  service,  both  boilers  are  used ; 
but  in  close  action,  the  lower  or  fighting  boilers  only — these 
being  sufficient  to  furnish  rather  more  than  half  speed. 

The  second  class  gun-boats  are  schooners  of  650  tons,  and  180 
feet  long,  with  engines  of  200  horse  power,  and  a  speed  under 
steam,  of  nine  knots.  They  are  manned  with  eighty  men,  and 
mount,  on  pivots,  one  68-pounder,  95  cwt.,  and  one  32  of  65  cwt., 
and  four  12-pounder  howitzers. 

The  third  class,  the  most  numerous,  are  schooners  of  about  110 
feet  in  length,  with  engines  of  60  horse  power,  and  a  speed, 
under  steam,  of  eight  knots,  with  a  draft  of  about  6  J  feet ;  they 
have  a  crew  of  40  men,  and  the  same  armament  as  the  second 
class. 

The  fourth  class  are  schooners  of  80  feet  in  length,  a  draft  of 
five  feet,  engines  of  20  horse  power,  and  a  speed,  under  steam,  of 
six  knots,  a  crew  of  30  men,  and  are  armed,  a  part  of  them  with 
one  68-pounder,  and  one  32-pounder ;  others  with  two  32-pounders. 

The  two  latter  classes  are  provided  with  movable  shields  of 
iron-plate,  bullet-proof,  which  are  shipped  at  pleasure  ;  raising 
the  height  of  the  bulwarks  to  about  seven  feet  in  case  of  having 
to  force  a  passage  defended  by  riflemen. 

The  engines  of  all  these  vessels  are  "  non-condensing,"  "direct- 


No.  58.] 


59 


acting,"  of  great  simplicity  and  compactness,  and  work  to  three 
times  their  nominal  power. 

They  usually  carry  a  pressure  of  60  pounds;  the  boilers" 
are  tested  to  180;  and  such  is  the  fidelity  with  which  the  work 
has  been  executed,  that  no  break-down  or  accident  has  occurred 
on  board  of  any  one  of  them.* 

[  D-  ] 

The  Engineers  are  not  the  inventors  nor  makers  of  ordnance. 
They  can  but  apply  to  the  best  advantage  such  as  is  supplied  to 
them. 

It  does  strike  me  that  its  construction  should,  so  far  as  it  is  in- 
tended for  harbor  defence,  be  studied  exclusively  in  the  light  of 
its  adaptability  to  that  object,  and  without  regard  to  conformity 
to  other  models.  Large  calibres  are  imperatively  demanded  for 
coast  defence,  nor  is  there  any  objection  arising  from  the  weight 
of  the  guns,  which  applies  so  strongly  in  naval  use.  Yet  the 
navy  have  successfully  introduced  a  gun  (Dahlgren's  11-inch 
gun)  which  throws  a  solid  shot  one-third  heavier  than  our  10- 
inch  columbiad. 

It  is  even  reported  that  the  Ordnance  Department  are  about 
abandoning  the  use  of  solid  shot  in  our  10  inch  guns,  as  if  against 
these  new  means  of  attack  (iron-clad  floating-batteries  con- 
structed expressly  to  batter  on  fortifications)  a  10-inch  shell 
could  hav%  any  62*6 1  whatever. 

If  we  must  throw  shells^  at  least  let  us  throw  them  of  such 
size  that  they  may  have  thickness  enough  not  to  break  against 
any  thickness  of  iron  a  vessel's  side  may  oppose.  Let  us  make 
them  such  that  (to  use  the  sportsman's  phrase)  ''every  shot  shall 
be  a  bird." 

The  Turks  have,  for  the  defence  of  the  Dardanelles,  guns  of  30 

*  "Notes  and  Observations  on  the  Review  at  Spithead,"  by  Commander  M.  M.  Walker, 
U.  S.  Navy. 

A  very  detailed  account  of  these  vessels  (as  also  an  immense  mass  of  interesting  matter, 
which  would  have  been  of  great  service  to  me  in  preparing  this  paper,  but  which  I  have 
been  unable  to  avail  myself  of,  though  I  have  received  much  valuable  information  from 
its  author)  is  contained  in  the  able  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  of  Major  R.  Delafield, 
Corps  of  Engineers,  one  of  the  Commissioners  sent  to  Europe  during  the  recent  European 
war,  by  the  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis,  then  Secretary  of  War,  for  the  purpose  of  examining 
and  reporting  upon  the  state  of  the  military  art  at  a  period  deemed  so  favorable  for  observ- 
ing its  modern  developments. 

This  report,  unfortunately  for  the  cause  of  military  science  in  this  country,  has  not  yet 
been  published;  neither  has  that  of  his  able  coadjutor.  Major  Mordecai,  of  the  Ordnance 
Corps. 

The  report  of  Capt.  McClellan,  the  third  Commissioner,  (from  which  an  extract  is  made 
in  appendix  "  E  ")  was  published  more  than  a  year  since,  and  has  been  promptly  appre- 
ciated by  the  military  profession. 


60 


[Assembly 


inches  calibre,  carrying  a  stone  ball.  I  do  not  k'>ow  whether 
there  is  any  impossibility  or  impracticability  in  the  construction 
of  guns  of  this  size ;  but  I  cannot  see  why  a  gun  of  greatly 
superior  calibre  to  anything  we  now  have  should  not  be  made 
expressly  for  harbor  defence. 

Such  guns  could  not  be  fired  with  the  rapidity  of  smaller  ones; 
perhaps,  too,  like  the  Turkish  guns,  it  would  be  found  best  to 
establish  them  on  fixed  lines  of  direction;  but  one  such  shot 
that  hits  would  be  worth  a  hundred  smaller  ones.  A  30-inch 
hole  could  not  he  plugged  ;  and  the  explosion  of  a  30-inch  shell 
would  send  a  vessel  to  the  bottom. 

Of  the  capability  of  such  guns  to  inflict  injury  and  of  the 
efficiency  of  batteries  mounted  with  them,  an  opinion  may  be 
formed  by  the  single  instance  (so  far  as  1  know)  that  their  quali- 
ties have  been  exhibited,  viz  :  the  retreat  in  1807  of  the  fleet  of 
Admiral  Duckforth. 

"  The  defences  of  the  channel  had  been  allowed  to  go  to  decay ; 
but  few  guns  were  mounted,  and  the  forts  were  but  partially  gar- 
risoned. In  Constantinople  not  a  gun  was  mounted,  and  no  pre- 
parations for  defence  were  made ;  indeed,  previous  to  the 
approach  of  the  fleet,  the  Turks  had  not  determined  whether  to 
side  with  the  English  or  the  French,  and  even  the  French  am- 
bassador had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  persuading  them  to  resist 
the  demands  of  Duckforth. 

The  British  fleet  consisted  of  six  sail  of  the  line,  two  frigates, 
two  sloops,  and  several  bomb-vessels,  carrying  eight  hundred  and 
eighteen  guns  (besides  those  in  the  bomb-ships.) 

"  Admiral  Duckforth  sailed  through  the  Dardanelles  on  the 
19th  of  February,  1807,  with  little  or  no  opposition.  This  being 
a  Turkish  festival  day,  the  soldiers  of  the  scanty  garrison  were 
enjoying  the  festivities  of  the  occasion,  and  none  were  left  to 
serve  the  few  guns  of  the  forts  which  had  been  prepared  for  de- 
fence. But  while  the  Admiral  was  waiting  on  the  sea  of  Mar- 
mora for  the  result  of  negotiations,  or  for  a  favorable  wind  to 
make  the  attack  upon  Constantinople,  the  fortifications  of  this 
city  were  put  in  order,  and  the  Turks  actively  employed  under 
French  engineers  and  artillery  officers  in  repairing  the  defences 
of  the  Straits."  Campbell,  in  his  Naval  History,  says  :  "  Admi- 
ral Duckforth  now  fully  perceived  the  critical  situation  in  which 
he  was  placed.  He  might,  indeed,  succeed,  should  the  weather 
become  favorable,  in  bombarding  Constantinople;  but  unless  the 


No.  58.] 


61 


bombardment  should  prove  completely  successful  in  forcing  the 
Turks  to  pacific  terms,  the  injury  he  might  do  to  the  city  would 
not  compensate  for  the  damage  which  his  fleet  must  necessarily 
sustain.  With  this  damaged  and  crippled  fleet  he  must  repass 
the  Dardanelles,  now  rendered  infinitely  stronger  than  they  were 
when  he  came  through  them. 

"  Under  these  circumstances,  the  Admiral  determined  to  re- 
treat ;  and  on  the  3d  of  April  escaped  through  the  Dardanelles, 
steering  midway  of  the  channel,  with  a  favorable  and  strong  cur- 
rent. 

"  This  escape,  however,"  says  Baines,  "  was  only  from  de- 
struction, but  by  no  means  from  serious  loss  and  injury.  In  what 
instance  in  the  whole  course  of  our  naval  warfare,  have  ships  re- 
ceived equal  damage  in  so  short  a  time  as  in  this  extraordinary 
enterprise  ?  In  detailing  the  extent  of  this  damage,  we  will  take 
the  ships  in  the  order  they  descended.  The  first  had  her  wheel 
carried  away,  and  her  hull  much  damaged,  but  escaped  with  the 
loss  of  only  three  men.  A  stone  shot  penetrated  the  second  be- 
tween the  poop  and  quarter  deck,  badly  injured  the  mizzen-mast, 
carried  away  the  wheel,  and  did  other  serious  damage,  killing 
and  wounding  twenty  men.  Two  shot  struck  the  third,  carrying 
away  her  shrouds  and  injuring  her  masts  ;  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded,  thirty.  The  fourth  had  her  mainmast  destroyed,  with 
a  loss  of  sixteen.  The  fifth  had  a  large  shot,  six  feet  eight  inch- 
es in  circuaiference,  enter  her  lower  deck ;  loss  fifty-five.  The 
sixth  not  injured.  The  seventh,  a  good  deal  damaged,  with  a 
loss  of  seventeen.  The  eighth  had  no  loss.  The  ninth  was  so 
much  injured  that,  had  there  been  a  necessity  for  hauling  the 
wind  on  the  opposite  tack  she  must  'gone  down  her  loss  was 
eight.  The  tenth  lost  twelve.  The  eleventh  was  much  injured, 
with  a  loss  of  eight — making  a  total  loss  in  repassing  the  Darda- 
nelles of  one  hundred  and  sixty-seven  ;  and  in  the  whole  expedi- 
tion, two  hundred  and  eighty-one,  exclusive  of  two  hundred  and 
fifty  men  who  perished  in  the  burning  of  the  Ajax. 

"  Such  was  the  effect  produced  on  the  British  fleet  sailing  with 
a  favorable  wind  and  strong  current  past  the  half-armed  and 
half-manned  forts  of  the  Dardanelles.  Duckforth  himself  says, 
that  had  he  remained  before  Constantinople  much  longer — till 
the  forts  had  been  completely  put  in  order — no  return  would 
have  been  open  to  him,  and  the  unavoidable  sacrifice  of  the 
squadron  must  have  been  the  consequence.    Scarcely  had  the 


62 


[Assembly 


fleet  cleared  the  Straits  before  it  (the  fleet)  was  reinforced  with 
eight  sail  of  the  line  ;  but,  even  with  this  vast  increase  of 
strength,  the  English  did  not  venture  to  renew  the  contest.  They 
had  effected  a  most  fortunate  escape.  General  Jomini  says  that 
if  the  defence  had  been  conducted  by  a  more  enterprising  and  ex- 
perienced people,  the  expedition  would  have  cost  the  English 
their  whole  squadron.''* 

Truly,  if  half-dilapidated  batteries  (worked  probably  by  un- 
practiced  hands)  could  inflict  these  serious  damages  upon  a  fleet 
not  engaged  in  actual  contest,  by  merely  trying  to  run  by,  under 
the  most  favorable  circumstances  of  wind  and  tide,  what  might 
not  such  batteries  be  capable  of? 

"  In  what  instance,"  says  Ad.  Baines,  "  in  the  whole  course  of 
our  naval  warfare,  have  ships  received  equal  damage  in  so  short 
a  time  as  in  this  extraordinary  enterprise  ?" 

It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  we  have  as  yet  had  no  fair 
instance  of  the  power  of  modern  shell  guns  from  land  batteries 
against  ordinary  ships  of  war.  In  the  few  direct  contests  which 
the  Allies  had  with  Russian  fortifications,  the  modern  armament 
does  not  appear  to  have  existed  ;  and  where  shells  were  thrown 
from  guns,  they  appear  to  have  been  of  inferior  calibre.  Yet  the 
Russians  with  the  shell-guns  of  their  fleet  blew  up  two  Turkish 
frigates  at  Sinope  infifteen  minutes. 

One  of  the  main  causes  of  inefficiency  in  coast  batteries,  which 
has  given  color  to  the  idea  that  they  may  be  passed,  or  even  at- 
tacked with  impunity,  I  conceive  to  be  the  want  of  skill  and  care 
in  the  use  of  the  gun.  The  result  is  a  prodigious  smoke,  and  a 
prodigious  throwing  away  of  balls,  and  very  little  damage  done. 
This  has  been,  however,  by  no  means  peculiarity  of  coast  defen- 
ces. The  same  system  of  randon  firing  has  hitherto  prevailed, 
both  in  the  use  of  small  arms  in  land  and  of  heavy  ordnance  in 
sea  battles ;  nor  has  it  occurred  apparently  to  even  the  greatest 
masters  of  the  art  of  war,  to  ask  why,  for  one  man  wounded,  or 
for  one  effective  shot  in  a  vessel's  hull,  so  many  thousands  of  shot 
should  be  thrown  uselessly  into  the  air. 

But  this  question  is  now  asked,  both  in  the  use  of  the  soldier's 
rifled  musket  and  in  the  management  of  ships'  guns,  as  well  as  of 
artillery  of  all  kinds. 

It  is  at  last  discovered  that  it  is  of  more  importance  to  teach 
the  soldier  to  direct  his  piece  with  accuracy  of  aim,  than  to  per- 

»  Halleck,  "  Military  Art  and  Science." 


No.  58.J 


63 


form  certain  motions  on  parade  with  the  precision  of  an  automaton. 
The  same  idea  is  now  infused  into  all  the  departments  of  military 
and  naval  science,  and  is  a  necessary  result  of  the  recent  great  im- 
provements in  the  construction  of  arms.  In  short,  the  truth  has 
at  last  become  apparent  that  the  old-fashioned  system  of  random 
firing,  though  perhaps  like  the  "  charge  of  the  six  hundred"  at 
Balaklava,  "  bien  magnifique,  7i^est  pas  la  guerre.^^ 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  we  should  apply  this  prin- 
ciple to  the  management  of  our  sea-coast  batteries,  and  give  it  a 
practical  effect.  The  volunteers  of  our  cities  will  constitute 
mainly,  in  time  of  war,  the  gunners  of  our  forts  and  manipulators 
of  our  sea-coast  guns.  In  time  of  war  they  will  probably  be  ex- 
ercised in  these  duties.  But  it  is  most  desirable  that  we  should 
have  at  all  times  a  body  of  gunners  practiced  in  these  exercises. 
The  result  would  be,  not  only  to  give  to  our  citizens,  as  well  as 
citizen-soldiers,  confidence  in  the  defences  provided  for  their  se- 
curity, but  it  would  disseminate  military  knowledge,  and  an  in- 
telligent idea  of  the  bearing  and  objects  of  the  different  defensive 
works.  To  carry  out  this  idea,  it  would  be  desirable  that  there 
should  be  at  each  considerable  seaport  town  a  sufiicient  garrison 
oi  artillery  troops  to  aid  in  the  instruction  of  the  volunteers.  In 
the  present  condition  of  the  army  this  cannot  be  hoped,  but  per- 
haps it  might,  at  least,  be  found  practicable  to  detail  an  artillery 
officer  or  two  for  the  purpose. 

[  E.  ] 

On  the  relative  value  and  strength  of  earthen  and  masonry 
revetted  works,  the  following  extracts  will  be  read  with  interest. 

The  first  is  from  the  Report  of  Capt.  George  B.  McClellan,  1st 
Cavalry,  one  of  the  "Military  Commission  to  Europe:" 

This  would  seem  to  be  the  proper  place  to  notice  a  popular 
fallacy  which,  for  a  time  at  least,  gained  extensive  credence.  It 
was,  that  the  siege  of  Sebastopol  proved  the  superiority  of  tem- 
porary (earthen)  fortifications  over  those  of  a  permanent  nature. 
It  is  easy  to  show  that  it  proved  nothing  of  the  kind  ;  but  that  it 
only  proved  that  temporary  works  in  the  hands  of  a  brave  and 
skillful  garrison  are  susceptible  of  a  longer  defence  than  was  gen- 
erally supposed.  They  were  attacked  as  field  works  never  were 
before,  and  were  defended  as  field  works  never  had  been  defend- 
ed. The  main  difference  between  properly  constructed  perma- 
nent fortifications  (intended  to  resist  a  siege)  and  temporary 


64  [Assembly 

works,  is,  that  the  latter  seldom  present  an  insuperable  obstacle 
against  assault,  while  the  former  always  do.  In  addition,  per- 
manent works  have  a  better  command  over  the  adjacent  country, 
and  are  more  carefully  and  perfectly  planned.  The  masonry 
walls  which  render  an  assault  impossible,  cannot  be  seen  from 
the  distance,  and  can  be  destroyed  only  by  establishing  batteries 
on  the  crest  of  the  glacis,  or  the  edge  of  the  ditch  ;  the  earthen 
parapet  alone  being  visible  beyond  that  point,  they  may,  until 
the  besiegers  arrive  there,  be  regarded  .in  the  same  light  as  field 
works,  with  the  difference  that  the  garrison  are  not  harassed  by 
the  necessity  of  being  constantly  prepared  to  repel  an  assault. 

"  Now,  in  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  the  trenches  of  the  besiegers 
never  reached  the  edge  of  the  ditch  ;  so  that,  had  the  fortifica- 
tion been  a  permanent  one,  the  most  difficult,  slow,  and  danger- 
ous part  of  the  siege  remained  to  be  undertaken,  viz  :  the  crown- 
ing of  the  covered  way,  the  establishment  of  the  breach  batter- 
ies, the  descent  and  passage  of  the  ditch,  and  the  assault  of  the 
breach  ;  in  other  words,  at  the  moment  when  the  weakness  of  the 
temporary  works  became  apparent  and  fatal,  the  true  strength  of 
the  permanent  defences  would  have  commenced  coming  into  play. 

"  Assuming  the  progress  of  the  attack  to  have  been  as  rapid  as 
it  was  under  existing  circumstances,  the  besiegers  on  the  8th  of 
September  would  not  yet  have  been  in  a  condition  to  crown  the 
covered  way,  the  siege  would  certainly  have  extended  into  the 
winter  ;  and  it  may  even  be  doubted  whether  the  place  would 
eventually  have  fallen,  until  the  Allies  were  in  sufiicient  force  to 
invest  the  north  as  well  as  the  south  side." 

These  views  are,  I  believe,  fully  sustained  by  the  other  com- 
missioners. Majors  Delafield  of  the  Engineers,  and  Mordecai  of 
the  Ordnance  Corps. 

But  a  more  remarkable  confirmation  is  found  in  the  recently 
published  "  Journal  of  the  Operations  of  the  Engineers  "  at  the 
siege  of  Sebastopol,  by  the  French  Engineer-in-Chief,  Gen.  Niel, 
which  I  also  extract. 

It  furnishes,  at  the  same  time,  a  simple  and  intelligible  expla- 
nation of  the  extraordinary  length  of  defence  of  that  place. 

"  Struck  by  the  length  of  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  certain 
foreign  officers  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  masonry-revetted 
scarps  are  not  of  incontestable  utility  in  fortified  places.'' 

"  Sebastopol,  a  vast  retrenched  camp,  defended  by  field  fortifi- 
cations of  strong  profile,  derived  its  principal  strength  from  an 


58.J  65 

armament  such  as.  could  only  exist  in  an  aisive  maritime 
arsenal,  and  from  a  large  army  which  always  preserved  its  free 
communications  with  the  interior  of  Russia." 

"  If  the  enceinte  had  been  provided  with  good  revetted  scarps  ; 
if  it  had  been  necessary  to  breach  these,  and  subsequently  have 
been  compelled  to  penetrate  through  difficult  passages,  in  rear 
of  which  the  heads  of  our  columns  would  have  met  an  army, 
Sebastopol  would  have  been  an  impregnable  fortress." 

"  When  we  compare,  in  effect,  the  Works  of  attack  at  Sebastopol 
with  those  of  an  ordinary  siege,  we  will  see  that  on  the  8th  of 
Sept.,  1855,  the  day  of  the  last  assault,  we  had  only  executed, 
after  the  greatest  effort,  the  besieging  works  which  precede  the 
crowning  of  the  covered  way  :  we  had  not  then,  as  yet,  entered 
upon  that  period  of  the  works  of  a  siege  which  is  the  most  diffi- 
cult and  the  most  murderous ;  and  there  was  no  occasion  to  en- 
gage ourselves  in  them,  since  the  ditches  and  parapets  of  the 
enceinte  were  not  insurmountable,  as  the  sequel  has  proved." 

"  The  difficulty  consisted  in  conquering  the  Russian  army  upon 
a  position  prepared  long  beforehand  for  its  defence,  quite  as 
much  as  in  surmounting  the  material  obstacle  of  the  fortification." 

"Our  places  of  arms  being  established  at  thirty  metres  from 
the  besieged  works,  we  were  able  to  choose  our  own  time  for 
action,  and  to  throw  ourselves  unexpectedly  upon  the  enemy 
when  the  fire  of  our  artillery  had  forced  him  to  shelter  himself, 
up  to  the  last  minute,  behind  his  numerous  blindages  ;  to  have 
gone  further  would  have  been  inviting  the  initiative  in  the  attack 
on  the  part  of  the  Russian  army." 

"  The  absence  of  scarp  walls,  which  would  have  secured  the 
place  from  escalade,  did  not  exercise  a  less  influence  upon  the 
defence  ;  for  the  besieged  were  compelled  to  keep  permanently 
at  the  gorges  of  the  works,  strong  reserves,  in  readiness  to  repulse 
the  assault,  which  they  saw  themselves  menaced  with  from  the 
commencement  of  the  siege." 

"  Finally,  it  can  be  remarked,  that  these  reserves,  which  were 
decimated  night  and  day  by  the  concentric  fire  of  our  batteries, 
were  able  to  issue  out  from  the  enceinte  through  wide  debouches, 
without  having  to  pass  through  the  narrow  defiles  which  are 
formed  by  the  draw-bridges  of  revetted  places ;  they  were,  then, 
a  permanent  threat  for  the  besiegers,  who  were  exposed  to  seeing 
their  trenches  anexpectedly  invaded  by  the  greater  part  of  the 
Russian  army," 

[Assem.  No.  58.]  9 


66 


[Assembly 


"  Neither  side,  consequently,  was  in  a  position  analogous  to 
that  which  is  presented  in  the  siege  of  a  fortified  place,  pro- 
tected from  insult  by  good  masonry  scarps."  (Note  to  page  443.) 

And  again,  page  423,  the  same  authority  remarks  (the  italics 
are  mine) : 

"  Now,  it  (the  Russian  army)  is  no  longer  able  to  escape  from 
the  concentric  fires  of  our  batteries  ;  for,  not  being  protected  by 
masonry  scarps,  it  is  obliged  constantly  to  keep  united  strong 
reserves  in  order  to  repulse  the  assault  with  which  it  is  at  every 
instant  menaced." 


Avery  Architectural  and  Fine  Arts  Library 
Gift  of  Seymour  B.  Durst  Old  York  Library 


